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In the first essay of this dissertation, we analyze the role of education subsidies on 
child labor in a situation where parents choose the quantity of children to have as well as 
their educational attainment. We find that lump sum education subsidies may increase 
(decrease) the equilibrium level of education and child labor depending on whether 
parents attach more weight on education (quality) or on school enrollment. Marginal 
education subsidies, in general, have the exact opposite effect. Some authors have found 
that a rise in the cost of schooling decreases child labor in some countries while 
increasing it in others. We are able to explain why one may observe these seemingly 
contradictory effects of subsidies on child labor across countries. 
 In the second essay I look at the effect of trade liberalization on child labor in the 
context of both a small and a large country. We analyze the effect of trade liberalization on 
child labor and fertility with respect to a small country. We show that tariffs may increase 
(or decrease) child labor and fertility depending on the slope of the labor supply curve and 
the type of equilibrium (high or low fertility). For a large country, fertility and child labor 
may qualitatively and quantitatively alter the effect of tariffs on the terms of trade. We find 
that in some cases, a rise in the tariff may deteriorate the terms of trade (starting from a 
zero tariff) and therefore an import subsidy may be optimal. 
 The third essay investigates whether preferential trading agreements are building 
blocs or stumbling blocs to multilateral trade. We use MFN and applied tariff data for 146 
countries (including the European Union,) from 1988-2002, and conclude that free trade 
areas (bilateral and multination) are stumbling blocs to trade. We also find that countries 
that sign more PTAs give lower tariff reductions than countries that don’t. WTO members 
are also found to offer lower tariff reductions than non WTO members. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction, Review of Literature and a Brief Overview 
 
1. Introduction 
The essays in this dissertation address some current issues in Development 
Economics and International Trade. The first essay, analyzes the role of education 
subsidies and its impact on child labor. The problem of child labor is a facet mainly 
associated with developing countries. In Asia and the Pacific region, there are 127 million 
economically active children (60% of total number of economically active children in the 
world) and in Sub-Saharan Africa about 48 million children are engaged in child labor.  
Although the issue of child labor has featured prominently in recent global trade 
discussions, child labor practices all over the world have been declining. There have been 
rapid changes in countries like Italy, China, and India. In some African and Latin 
American countries, this decline has been less marked. Lately, however, child labor has 
been enjoying renewed interest, which can be attributed partly to increased globalization. 
Trade has made goods from far-off lands available to people in high-income countries. 
Innovations in information and communication technology have made consumers, in the 
developed world, aware of the working conditions of children in different parts of the 
world wasting away their childhood in sweatshops. As Basu (1999) notes, these recent 
developments have brought people from very different backgrounds, and with very 
different perspectives on the issue, onto the same platform. On one side, we have people 
who are genuinely concerned about the plight of children all over the world; while on the 
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other side, we have people who seek protection against cheap third world labor, hiding 
under the mask of ‘concern for working children’. 
According to recent International Labor organization (ILO) estimates, there were 
about 186 million working children (“child labor”) between the ages of 5-14 in 2000. The 
sheer magnitude of the number itself is alarming even if one ignores the conditions in 
which they work.  The number alluded above is more restrictive, the estimate jumps to 
around 211 million (ILO 2002) if one chooses to employ a broader definition such as the 
number of economically active children. The estimate of child labor goes to 246 million if 
one takes children in the age group of 5-17 into consideration. Regardless of which 
definition one uses, the inescapable fact remains that incidence of child labor is a major 
problem. 
            Often these children work in industries that pose serious threat to their physical and 
mental well-being. In India, children working in the carpet industry toil for long hours 
under ill-lit, ill-ventilated and damp surroundings. Children working in leather 
manufacturing, chemical industries are also subject to serious health hazards. Children 
working more than 43 hours a week also suffer exhaustion, which takes a slow but steady 
toll on their health. Children engaged in prostitution, armed conflict, bonded labor, and 
serfdom (classified under the worst forms of child labor) are subject to severe physical as 
well as psychological harm. There are about 171 million children in hazardous work, like 
mining, chemical industries, leather, handlooms, and about 8.4 million children are in 
bonded labor, prostitution, serfdom, or, participating in armed conflict.  
            The fallout of recent global trade discussions has been to seek measures to put a 
stop to these practices. Such measures, both punitive and non-punitive, range from banning 
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all goods that use child labor as an input like senator Harkin’s Bill in the U.S., suspension 
of GSP privileges, trade sanctions, naming and shaming of firms who employ child labor, 
etc. Unfortunately, these measures have eclipsed formal analysis by quite a margin. It is 
indeed painful to see children work, foregoing the option of education, and consequently to 
ensure a better future for themselves. The alternative of not working as a child labor, 
however, may be to starve or to do household chores, which have a lower rate of return.  
We believe that fertility decisions ought to be a key feature in any discussion about 
child labor. Given that child labor arises because of poverty, low human capital 
accumulation of parents and zero savings, parents are more likely to endogenize their 
decision on how many children to have. In many developing countries children are the 
only source of support to the old. For instance in countries like India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, especially among the poor; it is the children’s responsibility to take care of the 
parents in their old age.  
        Since the role of poverty and capital market imperfection has been well explored, in 
the first essay we focus primarily on the consequences of education subsidies on child 
labor. This is relevant because following the threat of trade sanctions and suspension of 
GSP privileges; many developing countries are aggressively pursuing educational policy to 
reduce the incidence of child labor. We analyze the role of education subsidies in a one 
good model, where parents choose the quantity of children to have as well as their 
educational attainment.                 
In the second essay, we look at the impact of trade liberalization on child labor 
from the perspective of a small and a large open economy. Recently the issue of child labor 
has been at the center of debate and discussion in recent global trade discussions. Side by 
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side the rapid increase in the number of preferential agreements (PTAs) in the world over 
the last few decades, for both developed and less developed countries have sparked debate 
about the welfare consequences of PTAs. Even WTO members are involved in bilateral 
trading agreements. For instance, PTAs like ASEAN, MERCOSUR and ATPA are among 
developing countries that allow child labor.1 Multilateral trade negotiations through the 
WTO are under way, albeit slowly. Thus, the issue of trade liberalization both 
multilaterally and through PTAs is of major concern in terms of its effects on child labor.   
We analyze the effect of trade liberalization on child labor and fertility in the 
context of a small and large country. Many small countries that host child labor have 
formed PTAs. Some countries have also liberalized their trade multilaterally. Therefore the 
issue of trade liberalization and its effects on child labor are relevant. In the context of 
large country we analyze the tariff structure in the presence of child labor and endogenous 
fertility.  
In his 1958 paper, Bhagwati shows that growth that expands a country’s exports 
can lower its welfare (immiserizing growth) through a large deterioration in the terms of 
trade. In a subsequent paper, a Bhagwati (1968) show that growth cannot be immiserizing 
if an optimal tariff is imposed. The adverse terms of trade effect resulting from the growth 
of the export sector can be corrected by imposing a tariff on the importable. In his model, 
tariffs do not by themselves affect the growth of factors of production; in our model the 
growth in the factor of production is endogenous through the effect of tariffs on factor 
rewards. We find that in the case of a large open economy, tariffs may deteriorate the terms 
of trade under some conditions, if fertility is endogenous and child labor practices are at 
                                                 
1 Singapore and Chile are notable exceptions. 
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force.2 In that case, the optimal tariff turns out to be negative, i.e., an import subsidy is 
optimal.  
The third essay examines the empirics of whether Preferential trading agreements 
(PTAs) slowdown or promotes the multilateral trade liberalization process.  Over the last 
decade, there has been a substantial rise in the number of PTAs in the world. According to 
the WTO, there will be about 300 PTAs in force by 2005. Given that most WTO members 
and all the large countries are members of some Preferential Trading Unions, the effect of 
PTAs on world trade is at the center of debate among trade theorists and policymakers. The 
dynamic time path question is: do PTAs, in isolation or in tandem with multilateral trade 
liberalization (MTL), expand in a fashion that eventually subsumes all countries as its 
members without trade barriers (MTL path)? Or, do they undermine MTL by fragmenting 
the world into a number of powerful trading unions with higher trade barriers between each 
other?   
If membership into a PTA entails lower tariffs for all countries regardless of 
membership status, then PTAs are building blocs to multilateral trade because it supplants 
the multilateral trade liberalization path through the GATT or WTO. If membership in a 
PTA, however, implies higher tariffs to non-members, then it is necessarily a stumbling 
bloc. There is some anecdotal evidence that countries often do not want to reduce 
multilateral tariffs because they undermine the preferences given to other nations. One 
example Limao (2003) provides is that of low–value bottled and bulk rum, which enters 
the United States from several Caribbean countries under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. In 
her testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and 
                                                 
2 The cocoa producing countries like Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Brazil have some market power and also 
employ children in the production of cocoa. 
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Means on May 8th, 2001, Hon. Donna M. Christian-Christensen, Delegate from the United 
States Virgin Islands, stated that U.S. and E.U. negotiators had initially agreed during the 
1996 WTO tariff negotiations to phase out all tariffs on rum by 2000. This decision faced 
vehement opposition from Caribbean Governments, Administration Officials and Members 
of Congress. They emphasized that such a cut in tariffs for rum would deal a severe blow 
to the economies of the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the Caribbean. Their 
insistence resulted in a carefully constructed compromise under which the United States 
agreed to substantially liberalize duties on expensive rum. To protect the interest of the 
U.S. Virgin Islands and other Caribbean Island producers, however, the United States also 
agreed to maintain existing MFN rates on low-value bottled and bulk rum. 
Given the second best nature of the problem, there is no a-priori reason to believe 
that PTAs are necessarily stumbling blocs or building blocs.  It is easier to examine the 
effect of PTAs on multilateral trade barriers to infer whether they are stumbling or building 
blocs rather than look at the probability of occurrence of another round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. Limao (2003) shows that the U.S. offers smaller tariff reductions to non-
members on goods that are also imported from its PTA partners compared to goods that are 
imported only from non-partners. This is the strategic stumbling bloc effect. He, however, 
focuses only on U.S. and its PTA partners.  
The increase in the number of PTAs was particularly pronounced during 1990. 
Most countries either formed new or joined existing PTAs. At the same time many 
countries, however, also liberalized trade multilaterally. For instance, India liberalized its 
trade multilaterally in 1991. The multilateral trade liberalization process was most notable 
after 1995. We find that MFN and applied average tariffs (simple and weighted) have 
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fallen significantly from 1988-2002. We, therefore, use a trend to capture the secular fall in 
tariff due to multilateral trade liberalization pursued by these countries.  After controlling 
for the trend, we find that the presence of customs unions and Free trade areas cannot 
explain this downward fall in tariffs.  We find that countries that are not members of any 
FTA offer higher tariff reductions than countries that are members of some FTA. This 
finding is similar to that of Limao (2003). The crucial difference is that we take into 
account all CUs and FTAs that were notified to the WTO (for these 161 countries) while 
he uses tariff concessions data on individual goods for the U.S. and its PTAs.  
 
1.2. Review of Relevant Literature 
The review of the literature is divided into three sub-sections. In the first section, 
we review the relevant literature for the first essay. The second section refers to the 
research relevant for the second essay and the third section lists the papers that were 
pertinent for the third essay.  
 
1.2.1 Endogenous Fertility, Educational Attainment and Child Labor 
There is growing theoretical and empirical literature concerning the causes and 
consequences of child labor.  Basu and Van (1998) show that in less developed countries, 
parents send children to work not due a lack of parental consciousness but due to necessity. 
They show that there may be multiple equilibria, either good or bad. In the bad 
equilibrium, parents send their children to work and in the good equilibrium they do not. 
Baland and Robinson (2000) find that even if parents are altruistic and child labor is 
socially inefficient, it may arise in equilibrium because of imperfect capital markets and 
   9
zero savings. They also derive conditions under which a ban on child labor is Pareto 
improving.  
Using an overlapping generations general equilibrium model, Ranjan (2001) shows 
that inefficient child labor arises due to credit constraints. He also establishes a positive 
relationship between inequality of income distribution and the incidence of child labor and 
that trade sanctions may or may not curb child labor.     
Jafferey and Lahiri (2002) examine the interaction between credit markets, trade 
sanctions and the incidence of child labor. They show that both poverty and poor quality of 
education are important determinants of child labor. The incidence of child labor 
decreases, as access to credit becomes easier. Further, trade sanctions may actually 
increase the incidence of child labor, especially among poor households when access to 
credit is poor. The possibility diminishes as access to credit is improved.   
Bandyopadhyay and Bandyopadhyay (2003) show the effect of trade sanction in a 
general equilibrium trade model with two traded and one non-traded good. They find that 
the effect of trade sanctions on child labor depends crucially on the pattern of 
substitutability or complementarity of the excess demand functions between the export 
good and the non-traded good. They also find that trade sanctions reduces national welfare 
regardless of its effects on child labor. They show that an education subsidy for unskilled 
households reduces child labor. 
Tzannatos (1996) finds that Thai children under the age of 12 do not initially leave 
school in order to work. According to the ILO estimates, 5.4% of all children (between the 
ages of 5-9 years) in the world are engaged in full time work. The estimate increases to 
13.1 when one considers children between 10-14 yrs of age.  LFP rate among children (5-
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14 yrs) is 17% in Latin America, 21% in Asia and 40% in Africa, given that the 
compulsory school age is 14. This strongly suggests that parents not only choose whether 
to enroll their children in schools but also the level of their children’s education. 
Cartwright (1999) analyzes 1993 survey data for rural and urban children in 
Columbia and finds that the more expensive schooling is, the less likely it is that the child 
will work. She suggests that the cost of education in this case serves as a proxy for school 
quality. In most developing countries, however, schools, which cater to the poor in both 
rural and urban regions, are more likely to be of low quality. Most schools are inadequately 
staffed and lack facilities such as running tap water, sanitation, etc. Quality considerations 
therefore, cannot explain why child labor decreases in response to a rise in the cost of 
schooling.  
Cartwright and Patrinos (1999) find that in Bolivia cost of schooling increases the 
probability that a child will work. Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) analyze the work and 
school choices in Ghana, and find that cost of schooling increases both the probability of 
work and the probability of school attendance. We are able to explain why one may 
observe seemingly contradictory effects of education on child labor across countries. 
 
1.2.2. Endogenous Fertility, Child Labor and Optimal Tariffs  
Faced with threats of trade sanctions or suspension of GSP3 privileges, most 
countries are aggressively adopting policies to reduce the incidence of child labor. We 
examine the impact of reduction in tariff barriers on child labor and fertility in the second 
essay of this dissertation. So far as tariffs affect household income through changes in 
                                                 
3 Generalized System of Preference. 
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factor rewards and consequently on labor supply decisions, bilateral or multilateral trade 
liberalization, tariff reductions impact the incidence of child labor and fertility.  
The focus of the literature on child labor has been to outline the causes and 
consequences of child labor. Parents in less developed countries send their children to 
work not because of a lack of parental consciousness but due to necessity. Basu and Van 
(1998) hold that the labor market may be characterized by multiple equilibria. In the bad 
equilibrium wages are low and therefore parents send their children to work; in the good 
equilibrium wages are high and consequently the same parents do not send their children to 
work. A ban on child labor merely shocks the economy from a bad to a good equilibrium. 
According to Baland and Robinson (2000), child labor arises because of zero bequests 
arising out of poverty or imperfect or non–existent capital markets despite parental 
altruism. They show that if general equilibrium effects are well-behaved, then an 
endogenous change in the wage induced by the reduction in child labor may make parents 
and firms better off.  
Ranjan (2001) is the first to show that trade sanctions against countries which 
harbor child labor may fail to reduce the incidence of child labor.  He also shows that child 
labor arises due to credit constraints. He derives a positive relation between income 
distribution inequality and the incidence of child labor.  
According to Jafferey and Lahiri (2002), the incidence of child labor decreases as 
access to credit becomes easier. Further, trade sanctions may actually increase the 
incidence of child labor, especially among poor households when access to credit is poor. 
The possibility diminishes as access to credit is improved. The authors find that both 
poverty and poor quality of education are important determinants of child labor.  
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In a general equilibrium model, Bandyopadhyay and Bandyopadhyay (2003) have 
found the effect of the terms of trade on child labor depends critically on the pattern of 
substitutability (or complementarity) in excess demand functions. The effect of terms of 
trade on income distribution depends critically on whether the terms of trade change 
happens in the present or the future. The authors conclude that taxing the education of 
skilled households and using the revenues to subsidize the education of unskilled 
households is a more effective policy in developing nations than using trade sanctions.  
 
1.2.3.  Are Preferential Trading Agreements Stumbling Blocs to Multilateral 
Trade? 
There has not been a lot of empirical research focused on the effect of PTA 
formation on MTL. Some theoretical studies have been done, although theorists remain 
divided on the wisdom of whether PTAs promote or slowdown MTL. A few authors have 
shown that PTAs may reduce a country’s incentive for MTL. Levy (1997) shows the 
possibility to enter a PTA may cause a median voter to subsequently reject multilateral free 
trade even though he would have accepted it if no PTA had been available. Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) show that when producers are organized in lobbies the PTAs that are most 
likely to occur are the ones that cause the largest trade diversion. Krishna (1998) shows 
similar results using a different setup. He also argues that these PTAs can reduce the 
incentive to MTL. This occurs because the rents generated by the formations of these 
PTAs disappear when countries liberalize trade multilaterally. Producers that benefit from 
PTAs, therefore, will oppose MTL. In pure trade model with sequential bargaining, 
Bagwell and Staiger (2003) show that WTO members may hold back tariff concessions on 
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goods exported by countries expected to accede to the WTO. Limao (2002) models the 
interaction between PTAs between a large and a small country (Large Small PTA or 
LSPTA) and MTL.  He shows that LSPTAs generate a strategic motive for large countries 
to maintain some of their multilateral tariffs relatively higher. 
Some authors have shown that PTAs can actually be building blocs to multilateral 
trade. Bagwell and Staiger (1998) used a repeated game to analyze how PTAs affect the 
incentive to set a self-enforcing tariff. They show that two countries, A and B, gain from a 
PTA if they are relatively more patient than the third one, C. Also, when A and B lower 
tariffs for each other, they import more from each other and less from C. This reduces the 
cost of lowering tariffs on C. The last effect is independent of how patient A and B are. 
Thus, they show PTAs are stumbling blocs if A and B are very patient, and building blocs 
otherwise. 
Limao (2003) uses detailed data on U.S. tariff concessions during the most recent 
multilateral trade round to conclude that PTAs were a significant stumbling bloc to 
multilateral trade liberalization. He shows that the U.S. offers smaller tariff reductions to 
non-members on goods that are also imported from its PTA partners compared to goods 
that are imported only from non-partners. This is the strategic stumbling bloc effect. He 
focuses only on the United States and its PTA partners, whereas our empirical analysis is 
more general in the sense that it includes all PTAs (except preferential arrangements 
granted on an individual good basis).   
 
1.3 Overview of the Dissertation 
In the three subsections that follow, we highlight the major contributions of the 
three essays in my dissertation. The first two essays in my dissertation develop theoretical 
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models for child labor and optimal tariffs in the presence of endogenous fertility. The third 
essay is an empirical analysis of impact of preferential trading agreements on multilateral 
trade liberalization. The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows: Chapters 2, 
3, and 4 present the theoretical and empirical analysis. Chapter 5 provides a brief summary 
and conclusion as well as future research ideas. Below is a brief description of the results 
from Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  
 
1.3.1 Overview of Chapter 2 
In the theoretical model we have developed, a representative unskilled household 
chooses the number of children to have, the level of education, and the number of children 
to send to work. Parents also decide the level of educational attainment of children. 
Children are not allowed to combine work and school.4  Parents are assumed to attach 
different weights to school enrollment as well as quality. All children who go to school, 
however, receive the same level of education. We measure total quality by the product of 
enrollment and quality of each educated child.   
Our results indicate that lump sum education subsidies may increase (or decrease) 
the equilibrium level of education and child labor depending on whether parents attach 
more weight to quality (or the number of children in school) ignoring fertility effects.  
Marginal education subsidies, in general, have the exact opposite effect. Since marginal 
and lump sum education subsidies affect child labor in opposite directions, education 
subsidies including elements of both may fail to decrease the incidence of child labor. 
The Mexican government launched a program, PROGRESA, to eradicate child 
labor. It reports that although the enrollment in primary school is fairly comprehensive 
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(93-94%), it drops to (55%) once children reach the sixth standard. There is also a 
significant drop in enrollment when children reach the tenth standard, only 58% of those 
who are qualified actually enroll. Brazil increased the compulsory school age from 11 to 
14 in 1971, yet 85% left for the work force before they reached 14 regardless of whether or 
not they were covered by the revised legislation.  
We analyze the role of education subsidies in a one good model where parents 
choose the quantity of children to have as well as their educational attainment. Since the 
role of poverty and capital market imperfection has been well explored, we focus on the 
consequences of education subsidies on child labor. This is relevant because following the 
threat of trade sanctions, suspension of GSP privileges many developing countries are 
aggressively pursuing educational policy to reduce the incidence of child labor. 
In fact, educational subsidies given under PROGRESA are observed to have very 
little effect on the incidence of child labor. We are also able to show that educational 
subsidies have no discernible effect on parents’ decision to send a child to work.  Our 
results hold when fertility effects are included, provided fertility moves in the same 
direction as child labor. This occurs if the marginal utility of having another child 
decreases (or increases) with quality. 
 
1.3.2 Overview of Chapter 3 
Our focus in Chapter 3 is to see the effect of tariffs (with respect to a small country) 
on fertility and the incidence of child labor. We find that, for the small open economy, 
tariffs may increase (or decrease) fertility depending not only on whether the economy is 
characterized by a high fertility or low fertility equilibrium but also the slope of the labor 
                                                                                                                                                    
4 Our results are qualitatively unaltered if we instead we assumed that all children combine work and school 
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supply function.  If the labor supply function is positively sloped, child labor rises in the 
high fertility equilibrium in response to a wage increase. In the paper, we outline the 
conditions under which the labor supply curve is positively sloped. This is of particular 
interest due to the recent proliferation of PTAs in the world.  
Moreover, if the labor supply curve is positively sloped, then the optimal tariff in 
the presence of endogenous fertility and child labor may be higher or lower than the tariff 
in place.  Optimal tariffs, which neglect the effect of endogenous fertility and the presence 
of child labor, may impose significant losses in welfare from the standpoint of the tariff 
imposing country. 
The literature on optimal trade policy suggests that for a large country a positive 
tariff barrier may improve its welfare through the terms of trade effect. A related issue is to 
inspect the effect of tariffs on terms of trade in a large country framework when fertility 
decisions are endogenous and child labor practices exist.  The idea is that a large country 
solely concerned with national interest should restrict trade so as to exploit its market 
power. We analyze the role of tariffs in a large country general equilibrium framework 
with endogenous fertility and the presence of child labor. We find that compared to the 
scenario where child labor practices are non-existent and fertility decisions are not 
endogenized the presence of child labor and fertility change the nature of optimal tariffs. 
Unless the optimal tariff imposed under the first scenario (without child labor and 
endogenous fertility) is of some given magnitude, is either too high or too low. In some 
cases the optimal trade tariff may become negative.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
identically.  
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1.3.3 Overview of Chapter 4 
In the third essay, we examine the empirics of whether Preferential Trading 
Agreements (PTAs) slowdown or promote the multilateral trade liberalization process and 
address the dynamic path questions from the perspective of increasing membership in 
preferential trading agreements. We test whether joining more PTAs is associated with 
higher barriers to trade. So far, such a comprehensive analysis has not been conducted. We 
use MFN and applied tariff data for 146 countries (including the European Union) from 
1988-2002 and take account of all Customs unions and Free trade areas that were notified 
to the WTO till 2003 by these countries to show that bilateral and multilateral Free trade 
areas5 are stumbling blocs to MTL. 
We also find that, as an institution for multilateral tariff liberalization, the WTO has 
been more effective than the GATT. We find that average tariffs have fallen considerably 
after 1995 (i.e., after the formation of WTO). On the contrary, tariff rates were roughly 
constant under GATT; in fact average tariffs actually went up during 1989. Furthermore, 
our results indicate that GATT/WTO members offer lower multilateral tariff reductions 
than non-GATT/WTO members. Since tariff reductions by a member must be extended to 
all other GATT/ WTO members, it creates a disincentive for large tariff reductions. 
Customs unions are found to have no stumbling or building bloc effect to multilateral trade 
liberalization. This may be due to the limited variation of new membership or the lack of 
formation of new customs union from 1988.  Moreover, countries that sign more PTAs 
seem to have higher average multilateral tariffs than those who do not. 
                                                 
5 We focus our attention to customs unions and Free Trade Areas. Preferences by countries granted under 
Article V of GATT are ignored except that we take GSP into account. Since we work with average tariffs 
over all goods and partner countries we do not include preferences granted on an individual good basis. 
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Chapter 2 
Endogenous Fertility, Educational Attainment and Child labor:  




                           
We analyze the role of education subsidies on child labor in a situation where parents 
choose the quantity of children to have as well as their educational attainment. This is relevant 
because following the threat of trade sanctions, suspension of GSP privileges, many developing 
countries are actively pursuing education policies to reduce the incidence of child labor. We find 
that lump sum education subsidies may increase (decrease) the equilibrium level of education and 
child labor depending on whether parents attach more weight on education (quality) or on school 
enrollment. Marginal education subsidies, in general, have the exact opposite effect. Some authors 
have found that a rise in the cost of schooling decreases child labor in some countries while 
increasing it in others. We are able to explain why one may observe these seemingly contradictory 
effects of subsidies on child labor across countries. 
 
 
 JEL Classification: O10; O15; J13; J24 
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2.1. Introduction 
According to recent International Labor organization (ILO) estimates, there were 
about 186 million working children (“child labor”) between the ages of 5-14 in 2000. The 
sheer magnitude of the number itself is alarming, even if one ignores the conditions in 
which they work.  The number alluded above is more restrictive, the estimate jumps to 
around 211 million (ILO 2002) if one chooses to employ a broader definition such as the 
number of economically active children. The problem of child labor is a facet mainly 
associated with developing countries. In Asia and the Pacific region there are 127 million 
economically active children (60% of total number of economically active children in the 
world). Sub Saharan Africa accounts for 48 million. The estimate of child labor fluctuates 
widely, depending on how one defines work and a child, for instance, the estimate of child 
labor goes to 246 million if one takes children in the age group 5-17 into consideration. 
Regardless of which definition one uses, the inescapable fact remains that incidence of 
child labor is a problem of epic proportions. 
Some children work in industries, which pose serious threat to their physical and 
mental wellbeing. In India, children working in the carpet industry, toil for long hours 
under ill lit, ill ventilated and damp surroundings. Children working in leather 
manufacturing and chemical industries are also subject to serious health hazards. Children 
working more than 43 hours a week also suffer exhaustion, which takes a slow but steady 
toll on their wellbeing. Children engaged in prostitution, armed conflict, bonded labor, 
serfdom, classified under the worst forms of child labor, are subject to severe physical as 
well as psychological harm. There are about 171 million children in hazardous work, like 
mining, chemical industries, leather, handlooms etc. Further, 8.4 million children work in 
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bonded labor, prostitution, serfdom, armed conflict etc. These numbers, although shocking, 
unfortunately do not sum up the plight of working children.  
Although the issue of child labor has featured prominently in recent global trade 
discussions, the problem despite being of epic proportions, luckily has seen its heyday. 
Child labor practices all over the world have declined, rapidly in some countries like Italy, 
China, and India and less marked in some countries in Africa and the Latin Americas. The 
renewed interest in child labor can be attributed partly to increased globalization. Trade has 
brought goods produced in far-off lands into the lap of people in high-income countries. It 
has made people more aware of the working conditions of children in different parts of the 
world producing them. These, on the other hand, as Basu (1999) notes, have brought very 
different people on the same platform. On one side we have people who are genuinely 
concerned with the plight of children all over the world; while on the other hand we also 
have people who seek protection against cheap third world labor, hiding under the mask of 
‘concern for working children’. 
The fallout of recent global trade discussions has been to seek measures to put a 
stop to these practices. Such measures, both punitive and non-punitive, range from banning 
all goods that use child labor as an input like senator Harkin’s bill in the U.S., suspension 
of GSP privileges, trade sanctions, naming and shaming of firms who use child labor as an 
input, etc. Unfortunately, these measures have eclipsed formal analysis by quite a margin.  
It is indeed painful to see children work and forego the option of going to school and 
consequently earn a better living in the future but the alternative of not working as a child 
labor may be to starve or to do household chores which have a lower rate of return.  
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There is growing theoretical and empirical literature concerning the causes and 
consequences of child labor.  Basu and Van (1998) show that in less developed countries, 
parents sent children to work not due a lack of parental consciousness but due to necessity. 
They show that there may be multiple equilibria, good and bad, in the bad equilibrium 
parents send their children to work and in the good equilibrium they do not. Baland and 
Robinson (2000) find that even if parents are altruistic and child labor is socially 
inefficient, it may arise in equilibrium because of imperfect capital markets and zero 
savings. They also derive conditions under which a ban on child labor is Pareto improving.  
Ranjan (2001) uses an overlapping generations general equilibrium model to show 
that inefficient child labor arises due to credit constraints. The paper also establishes a 
positive relationship between inequality of income distribution and the incidence of child 
labor and that trade sanctions may or may not curb child labor.     
Jafferey and Lahiri (2002) examine the interaction between credit markets, trade 
sanctions and the incidence of child labor. They show that both poverty and poor quality of 
education are important determinants of child labor. The incidence of child labor decreases 
as access to credit becomes easier. Further, trade sanctions may actually increase the 
incidence of child labor, especially among poor households when access to credit is poor. 
The possibility diminishes as access to credit is improved.   
Bandyopadhyay and Bandyopadhyay (2003) show the effect of trade sanction in a 
general equilibrium trade model with two traded and one non-traded good. They find that 
the effect of trade sanctions on child labor depends, crucially on the pattern of 
substitutability or complementarity of the excess demand functions between the export 
good and the non-traded good. They also find that trade sanctions reduces national welfare 
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regardless of its effects on child labor. They show that an education subsidy for unskilled 
households reduces child labor. 
We analyze the role of education subsidies in a one good model where parents 
choose the quantity of children to have as well as their educational attainment. Since the 
role of poverty and capital market imperfection has been well explored, we focus on the 
consequences of education subsidies on child labor. This is relevant because following the 
threat of trade sanctions, suspension of GSP privileges; many developing countries are 
aggressively pursuing educational policy to reduce the incidence of child labor. 
We believe that fertility decisions ought to be a key feature in any discussion about 
child labor. Given that child labor arises because of poverty, low human capital 
accumulation of parents and zero savings, parents are more likely to endogenise their 
decision on how many children to have. In many developing countries, children are the 
only source of support to the old. For instance, in countries like India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, especially among the poor, older people co-reside with their children.  
Parents also decide the level of educational attainment of children. PROGRESA, a 
program launched by the Mexican government, to eradicate child labor, reports that 
although the enrollment in primary school is fairly comprehensive (93-94%), it drops to 
(55%) once children reach the sixth standard. There is also a significant drop in enrollment, 
when children reach the tenth standard, only 58% of those who are qualified, actually 
enroll. Brazil increased the compulsory school age from 11 to 14 in 1971, yet 85% left for 
the work force before they reached 14, regardless of whether or not they were covered by 
the revised legislation.  
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Tzannatos (1996) finds that Thai children under the age of 12 do not initially leave 
school in order to work. According to the ILO estimates, 5.4% of all children (between the 
ages of 5-9 years), in the world are engaged in full time work. The estimate, increases to 
13.1 when one considers children between 10-14 yrs of age.  LFP rate among children (5-
14 yrs) is 17% in Latin America, 21% in Asia and 40% in Africa, given that the 
compulsory school age is 14. This strongly suggests that parents not only choose whether 
to enroll their children in schools but also the level of education of children. 
In the model that follows, a representative unskilled household chooses the number 
of children to have, the level of education, and the number of children to send to work. 
Children are not allowed to combine work and school.6  Parents are assumed to attach 
different weights to school enrollment as well as quality. All children who go to school 
however receive the same level of education. Total quality is measured by the product of 
enrollment and quality of each educated child.   
We find that lump sum education subsidies may increase (decrease) the equilibrium 
level of education and child labor depending on whether parents attach more weight to 
quality (or the number of children in school), ignoring fertility effects.  Marginal education 
subsidies, in general, have the exact opposite effect. Since marginal and lump sum 
education subsidies affect child labor in opposite directions, education subsidies including 
elements of both may fail to decrease the incidence of child labor. 
In fact, educational subsidies given under PROGRESA are observed to have very 
little effect on the incidence of child labor. We are also able to throw light on the empirical 
finding that educational subsidies have no discernible effect on parents’ decision to send a 
                                                 
6 Our results are qualitatively unaltered if we instead assumed that all children combine work and school 
identically.  
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child to work. If fertility effects are included then our results follow provided fertility 
effects are small in magnitude.  
Cartwright (1999) analyzes 1993 survey data for rural and urban children in 
Columbia and finds that the more expensive schooling is, the less likely it is that the child 
will work. She suggests that, the cost of education serves as a proxy for school quality. 
However in most developing countries, schools, which cater to the poor in both rural and 
urban regions, are more likely to be of low quality. Most schools are inadequately staffed 
and lack facilities such as running tap water, sanitation etc. Thus quality considerations 
cannot explain why child labor decreases in response to a rise in the cost of schooling.  
Cartwright and Patrinos (1999) find that cost of schooling increases the probability 
that a child will work in Bolivia. Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) analyze the work and 
school choices in Ghana, and find that cost of schooling increases both the probability of 
work and the probability of school attendance. We are able to explain why one may 
observe seemingly contradictory effects of education on child labor across countries. We 
present the model and the results in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 concludes. 
 
2.2. The Model          
A representative unskilled household characterizes the economy. The household 
consumes good M . The price of M  is normalized to unity. The household’s utility 
depends on the consumption, the number of children born to it, the number of children 
going to school as well as the educational attainment of children in school. To make the 
analyses simple, we assume that the household’s utility function is separable in 
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consumption good and the quantity and quality of children. We also assume that they have 
linear preferences over M .  
The utility of an unskilled household is given byU M n n L g e gC( , ,( ) ( , ) )−
−α α1 ; 
where M  denotes consumption of the numeraire good. The household is endowed with 
one unit of adult unskilled labor.  The number of children in the family is given by 
n ; g e g( , )  is the stock of human capital (‘quality’) per child going to school which is a 
function of education ‘ e ’. On the other hand, g  may be interpreted as a factor, which 
enhances the transformation of education into human capital, which could be quality of 
schooling or endowment of talent in children. The household cares about the number of 
children going to school as well as the quality of children going to school; α  and 1-α   are 
the weights attached to number of children going to school and the quality of children in 
school respectively. Children sent to school however receive the same level of education. 
Children, who do not attend school, are assumed to be endowed with one unit of 
human capital, i.e., g g( , )0 1= . We follow Becker and Lewis (1973) and assume that the 
household cares about the quantity and the quality of children with one exception. In their 
model, it is assumed that all children are of the same quality and parents do not make any 
distinction among their children. Here we depart from them and assume that although 
parents care about the number of children born to the family, they may or may not view all 
children as being the same in terms of their choices, i.e., the household may send some 
children to school and some to work (though nothing hinges on this).7 
                                                 
7 Our results go through if instead of assuming that parents send ( )n LC− children to school, we assume that 
all children combine work and school. Each child is endowed with 1 unit of labor, which must be allocated 
between work and acquiring human capital. We let each child devote ( )1 − LC  units of labor to school. Since 
there are n  children, total school enrollment is then n LC( )1 − .  
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This allows us to entertain the possibilities where all children are sent to school, all 
children are sent to work and some are sent to school while the rest go to work. The first 
and the second possibility are corner solutions and therefore are of limited interest in the 
analysis because marginal changes in policy responses will have no effect on them.  We 
focus our attention to the third possibility where the family makes decisions at the margin, 
how many children to have, how many to send to school, etc. To make the analysis 
tractable, we also assume that the utility function, noted above, takes the following simple 
form 
LetU M n n L g e gC( , ,( ) ( , ) )−
−α α1 = M K n n L g e gC+ −
−( ,( ) ( , ) )α α1 ; 
whereα ∈ [ , ]0 1 ... (1) 
The utility function, K (.), embodies the satisfaction of the household from having 
n  children, the number of children sent to school, ( )n LC− , as well as the quality of 
children attending school g e g( , ) . The parameter α  reflects the preferences of the 
household over the number of children going to school and the educational attainment of 
these children. If α = 0 then households care only about the average quality of children 
attending school. If α  = 1, then households only care about how many children go to 
school. The reality of course includes these two extremes and in general some combination 
of these. 
We assume, K(.) , is twice differentiable and strictly concave with K2 > 0, K22 < 0, 
K11 < 0. Further we assume that, K1 , can be positive or negative.  The negative marginal 
utility of having an additional child captures the congestion effect with respect to the 
number of children born to the family. As the number of children born increases, parental 
responsibility also increases, which may create a disutility from having more children. A 
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bigger family also requires a higher degree of time commitment, which may reduce utility 
at the margin. More children also mean more rivalry in domestic consumption, which may 
reduce the utility from having another child. We also assume that g1  > 0, g11  < 0, g2  > 0, 
g22  < 0 and g12 > 0. Quality increases in response to education at a decreasing rate. 
Exactly similar results obtain for school quality.    
The household maximizes utility subject to the following budget constraint. 
M w C e n L V n wL wg e g n LC C C= − − − + + −[ { ( )( ) ( )}] ( , )( )1                                (2) 
The left hand side represents the consumption of M . The right hand side represents 
income of the household. w  is the wage rate. C e n LC( )( )−  is the total cost of 
educating ( )n LC−  children. C e( )   is the cost of education per child, which is given by: 
C e( )  = u e+ φ( ) ; u  > 0, ′φ ( )e  >0, ′′φ ( )e  > 0;  
where ‘ u ’ is the part of the education cost, which does not increase with education and 
hence will be called the fixed cost of education. It may be interpreted as barriers to entry in 
education. It is reasonable to expect that unskilled households face significant barriers to 
entry. The low educational attainment of the parents makes imparting education more 
difficult. The use of facilities such as the libraries, computers, and books are clearly 
outside the reach of the unskilled household. The subjective notion about education is also 
significantly different. 
LC   is the number of children who go to work, forgoing the option of going to 
school. V n( )  is the cost of bringing up children, which we call ‘rearing cost’. We assume 
V (.)  is increasing and convex. ‘ w ’ is the wage received by unskilled adult labor. The 
education and rearing costs are measured in units of labor time. 
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As noted above, g e g( , ) , is the amount of human capital acquired by a child going 
to school. It is worthwhile to note that the skilled wage, measured in efficiency units, 
depends on the amount of human capital one acquires. We would expect skilled wages to 
rise in response to an increase in human capital. Also for a given level of education, the 
amount of human capital one acquires may be influenced by factors such as quality of 
schooling, individual characteristics such as talent, luck, so on and so forth. Since policy 
changes cannot influence the endowment of talent or luck, we interpret, g , as the quality of 
schooling, which can be influenced by changes in government expenditure, foreign aid etc.  
The first term in the right hand side of equation (2) is the income from adult labor, 
net of rearing cost and the wages foregone in educating children. The second term reflects 
the income from child labor. We assume that a child born to a family can either go to 
school or work. The third term reflects the earnings of children who become skilled adults. 
 The households maximizes (1) subject to (2). The first order conditions are as 
follows:- 
 1 -λ  = 0                           (3)              
K K n L g e g wg e g wV n wC eC1 2
1 1+ − + = +− −α α α( ) ( , ) ( , ) ' ( ) ( )                          (4) 
K n L g g wg w eC2
1
1 11( )( ) ' ( )− − + =
− −α φα α                                               (5) 
wC e w wg e g K n L g e gC( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )+ ≥ + −
− −
2
1 1α α α                                     (6) 
Note that if equation (6) holds with the strict inequality then all children will be 
sent to work. Marginal changes in policy, in that case will have no impact on child labor. 
Therefore we assume that the equation holds with equality. 
Equation (4) gives us the optimal number of children in the family. The left hand 
side represents the marginal benefit from increasing fertility whereas the right hand side 
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represents the cost of increasing fertility. The change in utility in response to change in 
fertility is given by K n n L g e gC1
1( ,( ) ( , ) )− −α α . The wages earned by the marginal child as 
a skilled adult, is given by wg e g( , ) . The total cost of bringing up and educating the 
marginal child, is captured by wC e wV n( ) ' ( )+ . In equilibrium, we must have that the 
marginal benefit from increasing fertility should be equal to the marginal cost. 
Equation (5) gives us the optimal level of education. The left hand side represents 
the marginal benefit from increase in quality and the right hand side reflects the cost of 
doing so. The change in wages earned by the children as skilled adults in response to a unit 
change in the level of education is given by w n L g e gC( ) ( , ).− 1 The satisfaction received by 
the parent due to the change in quality in response to change in education is given by 
K n L g e g gC2 11( )( ) ( , )− −
−α α α . The right hand side represents the rise in cost due to a unit 
increase in the level of education captured by w n L eC( ) ' ( )− φ . In equilibrium the marginal 
benefit and the cost must balance each other. 
Equation (6) gives us the optimal level of child labor from the perspective of the 
family. The left hand side represents the opportunity cost of sending a child to school and 
the right hand side represents the gains from education and the increase in satisfaction from 
not sending a child to work. If it holds with strict inequality, then all children are sent to 
work and marginal changes in policy have no effect on parents’ decision to send a child to 
work. Therefore we focus on the case where the equation holds with equality so that 
changes in policy have some effect on child labor and fertility decisions.   
Rearranging equation (5) we get 
K n L g e g g w e gC2
1
1 11( )( ) ( , ) ( ' ( ) )− − = −
− −α φα α                                                  (5)′ 
Rearranging equation (6) we get  
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K n L













µ                                                         (6)′ 
where µ( )e = 







Plugging this back in (5), we get                                                                                              
g g e1 1 1[ ( ) ] ' ( )+ − =
−α µ φα                                                                                    (5)″ 
This implicitly defines e e u g= ( , , , )α δ . Substituting the expression from (6) in (4) 
we get the following equation 
 K n n L g e g w wV nC1
1( ,( ) ( , ) ) ' ( )− + =−α α                                             (7) 
 The equilibrium level of education, fertility, child labor and consumption of M  
are obtained recursively as follows. Given ‘ w ’, ‘ u ’ and ‘ g ’ the equilibrium level of 
education, e∗ , is obtained from (5)′. 
Equation (6) implicitly defines L L n e w u gC C= ( , , , , ) . Using this in equation (4), we 
get n n e u w g= ( , , , ) . Plugging e∗  in (4), gives us the equilibrium level of fertility n∗ . 
Plugging e∗and n∗  in equation (6), gives us the optimal level of child labor LC
∗ . The 
equilibrium level of M  is obtained from equation (3). For simplicity we assume that the 
cost of education takes the following simple form. C e u e( ) = + δ . 
Proposition 1:  ∃ ∈∗α [ , ]0 1  such that 
a. The equilibrium level of education rises (or falls) with δ  if α α α0 ≤ <
∗  
(orα α∗ < ≤ 1). 
b. The equilibrium level of education falls (or rises) with u if 0 ≤ < ∗α α  
(orα α∗ < ≤ 1). 











 where  N1  = g e g1 1( )− −α α . 
D c g g g g g g= + − + − + − + − − −[( )( ) ( )] [( ) ' ( ) ] " '1 1 2 1 1 2 111 1 1 1α α α φ α α φ αφ ;   
 It is easy to check that forα = 0, D > 0 and forα = 1, D  < 0. Since D  is 
continuous then there exists a α∗  such that D( )*α α= = 0. Therefore, for all 0 ≤ < ∗α α , 
D  > 0 and for allα α∗ < ≤ 1, D  < 0. 
Now, ( ( ) )g e g1 1− −α α δ  = − + − + −g g u g1 1 1[ ( )( )]α α .  











Since the numerator is negative the sign of the above expression depends on the 
sign of the denominator D . We have already shown that D  is positive 0 ≤ <α α *  for and 









 < o for allα α∗ < ≤ 1. 
If ( )1+ −u g < 0 then we can show that there exists  [ , ]α0 1
8 such that the above 










where N = ( )( )1 1− α g   and 
D c g g g g g g= + − + − + − + − − −[( )( ) ( )] [( ) ' ( ) ] " '1 1 2 1 1 2 111 1 1 1α α α φ α α φ αφ ;   
                                                 
8 If  K2  is sufficiently large andα ≠ 0 , then α 0 and is very close to zero. 
9 The detail proof of this assertion is available from the authors on request. 
   32





 depends on the sign of D. Therefore, for all 























 > 0. 
 
Comment:        
We first note that the family cares about total quality with different weights 
attached to school enrollment and education. A rise in δ , tends to decrease the equilibrium 
level of education. If more weight is attached to education, then reducing education is more 
costly. As a result, the family sends fewer children to school and restores the loss in quality 
by increasing education. If more weight is attached to school enrollment, then reducing the 
number of children in school is more costly than reducing the level of education. Therefore 
the family reduces the equilibrium level of education while sending more children to 
school. 
Suppose u  increases. An increase in u , would tend to encourage the family to send 
fewer children to school, i.e., child labor increases at the margin. As a result, total quality 
falls. To restore the original level of quality, the family must then increase the level of 
education. Notice that when more weight is attached to education, the family already has 
chosen a high level of education to begin with; therefore increasing education at the margin 
only increases the marginal disutility of education. Therefore, the family reduces the level 
of education and restores the loss in quality by increasing school enrollment. However, if 
more weight is attached to quantity, then a reduction in school enrollment reduces total 
quality. Suppose that the family decides to reduce the level of education while keeping the 
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same number of children at school. Since more weight is attached to quantity, a huge drop 
in education is required to keep the same number of children in school. However that will 
also reduce total quality. As a result, the family tries to restore total quality by increasing 
the level of education while sending fewer children to school. 
 
Proposition 2:  Fertility increases (or decreases) in response to a rise in u  and δ  
according as K12 is negative (or positive). 
Proof: From equation (7) and (6) we note that n n e u g u g= ( ( , , ), , , )δ α . Taking derivatives 
























































1 1 1= + − − −− −α
∂
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1 1α α αα α α α αg K n L n L K g n LC C C
− − − − −− − − − −[ ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ]
 
Algebraically D1  can be shown to be strictly negative if K  is strictly concave. 





C  is positive because the numerator and the 
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denominator are both positive. Therefore N2  is positive (or negative) if K12  is negative 








 where  N3  = − −





1 1( )α αα
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∂δ
 and  






1 1 1= + − − −− −α
∂
∂
α α( ) ( ) "( ) . 
We already know that if K  is strictly concave then D1  is negative. Therefore − D1  





g K n L n L K g n LC C Cα α α




1 11− − − − −− − − − −[ ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ]
 > 0. 
Therefore, N 3  is positive (or negative) if  K12  is negative (or positive). 
 
Comment: 
If the level of education is held constant, then an increase in the fixed cost of 
education increases child labor at the margin. As child labor increases total quality falls.  If 
K12  is negative, then a fall in total quality must necessarily increase the marginal utility of 
having children, as a result fertility rises. If K12  is positive, then a fall in total quality 
reduces the marginal utility from having children, therefore fertility is reduced. The 
intuition for increase in δ  is similar.         
 
Proposition 3: Child labor increases (or decreases) in response to  
a) an increase in u  if α α∗ < < 1 and K12  < 0 (or 0 ≤ <
∗α α  and K12  > 0). 
b) an increase in δ  if  α α α0 < <
∗  and  K12  < 0 ( or α α α
∗ < < 0  and K12 > 0) 
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Proof: 10   
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It is easy to check that  K n L n L g KC C2
2 2 2 1
221( )( ) ( )α α
α α α− − + −− − −  < 0 
The above expression can be simplified to  
( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ]
[ ( )( ) ( ) ]
n L K n L g K K n L
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Note that [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ]K n L g K K n LC C21
1 1
22 2
11+ − − − −− − −α αα α < 0, if the cross effect is 




















































C C+  can be shown to be 
negative. Therefore, if K12  > 0 and 0 ≤ <
∗α α  then 
dL
du
C  < 0. Now, if K12 < 0 then 
                                                 
10 The detailed proof is relegated to the appendix. 


























C  > 0. 




Suppose, K12  is negative and α α>
∗  holds. Notice in that case, a rise in u  implies 
a rise in education. Further, a rise in u  also increases fertility. A rise in fertility and 
education increases total quality. The rise in total quality increases the marginal disutility 
of quality as a result child labor must increase.  Now suppose that 0< α < α∗  and K12  is 
positive. A rise in u  then reduces education and fertility.  This reduces total quality 
thereby reducing the marginal disutility of quality. As a result child labor decreases.  
Now consider a rise in the marginal cost of education. Suppose first that 
α α α0 < <
∗  holds and K12  < 0. Then a rise in the marginal cost (δ ) increases both 
education and fertility. This increases quality thereby increasing the marginal disutility of 
quality; as a result child labor must increase. If α α α∗ < < 0  and K12  < 0, then an increase 
in the marginal cost of education leads to a fall in the level of education as well as fertility. 
The decrease in quality decreases the marginal disutility of quality; therefore child labor 
must decrease.  
                                                 
11 The detail proof of part (b) is relegated to the appendix. 
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Note that for a wide range of parameter values, [ , ]α α0
0 , lump sum subsidies and 
marginal subsidies work in opposite directions, provided that the effect of education 
subsidies on fertility are sufficiently small, which is likely to hold in reality. This explains 
why Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) find that in Ghana, a rise in the cost of education 
increases both the probability of work and probability of schooling. Further, we note that 
the magnitude of marginal subsidies may be greater, equal or lesser than that of a lump 
sum subsidy. Suppose for a given α , the cost of schooling increases. This increase is 
likely to incorporate both the fixed and the marginal component of cost. As we have seen, 
that one of them tends to increase child labor while the other reduces it. Whether child 
labor decreases or increases depends on the relative strength of these two effects. This 
explains why one might see child labor decreasing in response to a rise in cost of schooling 
as Cartwright (1999) finds in Columbia and increase in others as Cartwright and Patrinos 
(1999) find in Bolivia. This also explains why PROGRESA, has been only modestly 
successful in reducing child labor since it contains elements of both a lump sum subsidy as 
well as marginal subsidy.  
 
2.3 Conclusion  
We analyze the role of education subsidies on child labor where a family chooses 
both fertility and the education attainment of children. Parents are assumed to care about 
the quantity of children as well as total quality, but attach different weights to school 
enrollment and the level of education. We find that, for a wide range of parameter values, 
if more weight is given to quality then an increase in the lump sum cost reduces education, 
whereas an increase in the marginal cost of education increases education. Further, we also 
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underline conditions, in which increases in lump sum and marginal education costs 
increase (or decrease) fertility and child labor. We feel that a detailed empirical study is 
necessary to evaluate the education policies pursued by different countries in directions our 
model suggests. This will help to implement more fruitful and effective education policies 
in the future. 
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Mathematical Appendix : 
We outline a detailed proof of part (a) and (b) of Proposition 3 
a) Child labor increases (or decreases) in response to an increase in u  if α α∗ < < 1 
and K12  < 0 (or 0 < <
∗α α  and K12  > 0). 
We prove part (a) of proposition 3 in two parts, (i) and (ii). 













C C+  can be shown to be negative. 













C C+  can be shown to be positive. 
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The numerator is positive from above. The denominator is positive for∀ ∈ ∗α α[ , )0 . If 
K12 > 0 then child labor rises with respect to a rise in u . 
The second part follows easily from the first. We note that the numerator ( N1 ) is 
still positive; the denominator ( D1 ) however is negative for ∀ ∈
∗α α( , )1 because D is 
positive for∀ ∈ ∗α α( , )1 .  If K12  < 0 the child ambiguously falls with respect to u   
a) Child labor increases (or decreases) in response to an increase in δ  if α α α0 < <
∗   
and  K12  < 0 (or α α α
∗ < < 0  and K12 > 0). 
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e LC C+  < 0 for (α α α∗ < < 0 ).  As before we 























e LC C+ . Plugging in the 
explicit expression for the partials and a little algebra 
yields:
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We observe that for α α= ∗ , N2  < 0 and for α = 1, N2 > 0. Since N2  is continuous in   
α  to the right of α∗  then there exists a α 0  such that for α α α∈ ∗( ]0 , N2 < 0. 
Since D2  is positive for α α α∈





 < 0. If  K12  > 0 then child labor 
falls with respect to a rise in δ   We have so far assumed that  g e g1 1( )− −α α  < 0, we 
now show that under a very general assumption it is likely to hold. We prove this result as 
Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1: We need to show that ( ( ) )g e g1 1− −α α < 0. 
Proof:  Suppose that 1 0+ − >u g . 
We have  
∂
∂δ
α αe g e g
D
=
− −1 1( )  




 > 0 for  α α α0 < <




 < 0   if  
α α∗ < < 1. However, if  1 0+ − <u g  holds, then, the sign of  ( ( ) )g e g1 1− −α α  becomes 
ambiguous. We proceed as follows: we assume g  is not sufficiently small so that 1+ −u g  
is not too negative.12 For α = 1, ( ( ) )g e g1 1− −α α < 0 and if  α = 0 then 
( ( ) )g e g1 1− −α α >0. Since  ( ( ) )g e g1 1− −α α  is continuous then there exist an 
~ ( )α α α  [0,1]  s. t g1∈ − − =1 0e g . If  g is not too large in the sense noted above, then, it is 
                                                 
12 This assumption is likely to hold in reality. If  g  were sufficiently large then the problem  
    of child labor will not persist because the returns to education in the future are  
    sufficiently high for parents to withdraw children from work and send them to school.              
    Empirical evidence suggests that it is indeed the case, in most third world countries where  
    child labor persists the return to education is very low. 
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easy to show that ~α α  < ∗ . Further, we can show that for∀ − −  >    g  <  01α α α α
~ ( )1 e g , 
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Chapter 3 
Endogenous Fertility, Child labor and Optimal Tariffs 
 
Abstract 
This paper looks at the effect of trade liberalization on child labor in the context of both a 
small and a large country. We first analyze the effect of trade liberalization on child labor and 
fertility with respect to a small country. We show that tariffs may increase (or decrease) child labor 
and fertility depending on the slope of the labor supply curve and the type of equilibrium (high or 
low fertility). For a large country, fertility and child labor may qualitatively and quantitatively 
alter the effect of tariffs on the terms of trade. We find that in some cases, a rise in the tariff may 
deteriorate the terms of trade (starting from a zero tariff) and therefore an import subsidy may be 
optimal. 
 
JEL Classification: O10; J24; F16 
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3.1 Introduction 
Over the last few decades there has been a huge proliferation in the number of 
preferential agreements (PTAs) in the world, involving both developed and less developed 
countries. Recently the issue of child labor has also featured prominently in global 
discussions. So far as tariffs affect household income through changes in factor rewards 
and consequently on labor supply decisions, bilateral or multilateral trade liberalization and 
Preferential Trading Agreements involving reduction in tariff barriers impact the incidence 
of child labor and fertility.  
Following the threat of trade sanctions, suspension of GSP13 privileges, most 
countries are aggressively adopting policies to reduce the incidence of child labor. The 
focus of the literature on child labor has been to outline the causes and consequences of 
child labor. Basu and Van (1998) show that parents in less developed countries send their 
children to work not because of a lack of parental consciousness but due to necessity. The 
labor market may be characterized by multiple equilibria. In the bad equilibrium wages are 
low and therefore parents send their children to work, in the good equilibrium wages are 
high and consequently the same parents do not send their children to work. A ban on child 
labor merely shocks the economy from a bad to a good equilibrium. Baland and Robinson 
(2000) show that child labor arises because of zero bequests arising out of poverty or 
imperfect or non–existent capital markets despite parental altruism. They show that if 
general equilibrium effects are well behaved then a small ban on child labor may bring 
about a Pareto improvement. An endogenous change in the wage induced by the reduction 
in child labor may make parents and firms better off. 
                                                 
13 Generalized System of Preference. 
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Ranjan (2001) develops an overlapping generations model to analyze the impact of 
trade sanctions on child labor. He shows that child labor arises due to credit constraints. It 
also derives a positive relation between inequality in income distribution to the incidence 
of child labor. Further, he is the first to show that trade sanctions against countries which 
harbor child labor may fail to reduce the incidence of child labor.  
Jafferey and Lahiri (2002) examine the interaction between credit markets, trade 
sanctions and the incidence of child labor. They show that both poverty and poor quality of 
education are important determinants of child labor. The incidence of child labor decreases 
as access to credit becomes easier. Further, trade sanctions may actually increase the 
incidence of child labor, especially among poor households when access to credit is poor. 
The possibility diminishes as access to credit is improved.   
Bandyopadhyay and Bandyopadhyay (2003) in a general equilibrium model, show 
that the effect of the terms of trade on child labor depends critically on the pattern of 
substitutability (or complementarity) in excess demand functions. The effect of terms of 
trade on income distribution depends critically on whether the terms of trade change 
happens in the present or the future. They show that rather than using trade sanctions a 
more effective policy would be to persuade developing nations to tax the education of 
skilled households and use the revenues to subsidize the education of unskilled households.  
The role of fertility has not received the attention it deserves. We believe that 
fertility decisions ought to be a key feature in any discussion about child labor. Given that 
child labor arises because of poverty, low human capital accumulation of parents and zero 
savings, parents are more likely to endogenise their decision on how many children to 
have. In many developing countries children are the only source of support to the old. For 
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instance in countries like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, especially among the poor, older 
people co-reside with their children.  
Our focus in the first part of the paper is to see the effect of tariffs (with respect to a 
small country) on fertility and the incidence of child labor. We find that for a small open 
economy, tariffs may increase (decrease) fertility depending on whether the economy is 
characterized by high fertility (low fertility) equilibrium as well as the slope of the labor 
supply function.  Child labor surely goes up in the high fertility equilibrium in response to 
an increase in wages given that the labor supply function is positively sloped. We also 
underline the conditions, under which the labor supply curve is positively sloped. This is of 
interest because of the recent proliferation in the number of preferential trading agreements 
in the world. The reduction in tariffs, following a PTA or MTL, will in most cases alter the 
factor rewards and in some cases may also bring about a change in terms of trade. Most 
WTO members are also involved in bilateral trading agreements. For instance PTAs like 
ASEAN, MERCOSUR and ATPA are among developing countries harboring child labor.14 
Also multilateral trade negotiations through the WTO, albeit slowly, are under way. Thus 
the issue of trade liberalization is of major concern in terms of its effects on child labor. 
A related issue is to inspect the effect of tariffs on terms of trade in a large country 
framework when fertility decisions are endogenous and child labor practices exist.  The 
literature on optimal trade policy suggests that for a large country a positive tariff barrier 
may improve its welfare through the terms of trade effect. The idea is that a large country 
solely concerned with national interest should restrict trade so as to exploit its market 
power. We analyze the role of tariffs in a large country general equilibrium frame work in 
the context of endogenous fertility and the presence of child labor. Bhagwati (1958) shows 
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that growth which expands a country’s exports can lower its welfare (immiserizing 
growth) through a large deterioration in the terms of trade. In a following paper Bhagwati 
(1968) shows model growth cannot be immiserizing if an optimal tariff is imposed.  
The adverse terms of trade effect, resulting from the growth of the export sector can 
be corrected by imposing a tariff on the importable. In his model, tariffs do not by 
themselves affect the growth of factors of production; in our model the growth in the factor 
of production is endogenous through the effect of tariffs on factor rewards. We find that in 
the context of a large open economy, tariffs may deteriorate the terms of trade under some 
conditions, in a situation where fertility is endogenous and child labor practices are at 
force.15 In that case the optimal tariff turns out to be negative, i.e. an import subsidy is 
optimal.  
Further, if the labor supply curve is positively sloped then the optimal tariff, in the 
presence of endogenous fertility and child labor, may be higher or lower than the tariff in 
place.   Optimal tariffs, which neglect the effect of endogenous fertility and the presence of 
child labor, may impose significant losses in welfare from the tariff imposing country’s 
perspective. We present the small open economy case in section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents 
the case of a large open economy. Conclusions follow in section 3.4. 
 
3.2 A small open economy 
In this section the issue of child labor and endogenous fertility is analyzed in the 
context of a small open economy. We borrow the basic setup from Bandyopadhyay and 
Roy (2003).  The economy is characterized by a representative unskilled household There 
                                                                                                                                                    
14 Singapore and Chile are notable exceptions. 
   50
are two goods in the economy, A  and M . A  is the numeraire. Good M  is imported while 
good A  is exported. Since the economy is small, the household takes the prices of goods 
as given. The government imposes a tariff ‘ t ’ on the import. The government redistributes 
the tariff revenue to the representative household, via lump sum transfers, R . The price of 
good A  is normalized to unity, therefore the effective price of good M  is P tM + . The 
capital and land used in production is also owned by the household. 
The household is endowed with one unit of adult labor. Utility depends on the 
consumption of goods A  and M , the number of children born to the family, the number of 
children going to school as well as the educational attainment of each child attending 
school. The utility of the household is given by U A M n n L g e gC( , , , ( ) ( , ) )−
−α α1 ; where A  
and M  denote the consumption of the goods in question.  The number of children in the 
family is given by n ; g e g( , )  is the stock of human capital (‘quality’) per child going to 
school which is a function of education  ‘ e ’. g  may be interpreted as a factor, which 
enhances the transformation of education into human capital, which could be quality of 
schooling or endowment of talent in children. The weights α  and 1- α    reflects the 
importance parents attach to the number of children going to school and the quality of 
children in school respectively. Children sent to school however receive the same level of 
education. 
Children who do not attend school are assumed to be endowed with one unit of 
human capital, i.e., g g( , )0 1= . We follow Becker and Lewis (1973) and assume that the 
household cares about the quantity and the quality of children with one exception. In their 
model they assume that all children are of the same quality and parents do not make any 
                                                                                                                                                    
15 The cocoa producing countries like Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Brazil have some market power and also 
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distinction among their children. This assumption is relaxed; it is assumed that although 
parents care about the number of children born to the family they may or may not view all 
children as being the same in terms of their choices, i.e., the household may send some 
children to school and some to work (though nothing hinges on this).  
This allows one to entertain the possibilities where all children are sent to school, 
all children are sent to work and some are sent to school while the rest go to work. The 
first and the second possibility are corner solutions and therefore are of limited interest in 
the analysis because marginal changes in policy responses will have no effect on them.  
Only the third possibility is of interest, where the family makes decisions at the margin, 
how many children to have, how many to sent to school, etc. The utility function is 
assumed to be separable in the consumption goods as well as the quality and the quantity 
of children. Further, the household is assumed to have quasi-linear preferences over A  
and M . The utility function is given by 
U M n n L g e gC( , , ( ) ( , ) )−
−α α1 = u M A K n n L g e gC( ) ( ,( ) ( , ) )+ + −
−α α1 ;α ∈ [ , ]0 1  (1)   
The utility function K (.) embodies the satisfaction of the household from having n   
children, the number of children sent to school as well as the quality of children sent to 
school. Where ( ) ( , )n L g e gC−
−α α1  is the total quality gained from sending ( )n LC−  
children to school each acquiring human capital g e g( , )  through education. We assume 
K(.) is twice differentiable and strictly concave with K2 > 0, K22 < 0 and K11 < 0. Further 
we assume that K1  can also be negative in equilibrium. This assumption captures the 
congestion effect with respect to the number of children born to the family. As the number 
of children increases, parental responsibility increases which may create a disutility from 
                                                                                                                                                    
employ children in the production of cocoa. 
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having more children. A large number of children also require greater commitment in 
terms of time, which may reduce utility at the margin. Too many children also imply a 
higher degree of rivalry in domestic consumption, which reduces the utility from having 
more children.  We also assume that g1  > 0, g11  < 0, g2  > 0, g22  < 0 and g12 > 0. Quality 
increases in response to education at a decreasing rate. Exactly similar results obtain for 
school quality.     
    The household maximizes utility subject to the following budget constraint  
( ) [ { ( )( ) ( )}] ( , )( )P t M A w C e n L V n wL wg e g n L
r K r T R
M
K T
C C C+ + = − − − + + − +
+ +
1
      (2) 
The left hand side represents the expenditure on goods M and A respectively. The 
right hand side represents income of the household. w  is the wage rate. C e n LC( )( )−  is 
the total cost of educating ( )n LC−  children.  The cost of education C e( )  is assumed to be 
increasing and convex. 
LC   is the number of children who go to work forgoing the option of going to 
school. V n( )  is the cost of bringing up children, which we call ‘rearing cost’. We assume 
V (.)  is increasing and convex. The education and rearing costs are measured in units of 
labor time. 
The first term in the right hand side is the income from adult labor net of the 
rearing cost and the wages foregone in educating children. The second term reflects the 
income from child labor. To make the analyses simple we do not allow for the possibility 
of combining work and school.16 We assume that a child born to a family can either go to 
school or work. The third term reflects the earnings of children who become skilled adults.  
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The fourth and fifth term on the right hand side reflect the income received by the 
household from ownership of capital. The last term is the lump sum tariff revenue on 
imports redistributed to the household. The first order conditions of the maximization 
exercise yields 
1-λ =0                                                                                                              (3) 
u M P tM' ( ) ( )− + =λ 0                       (4)                       
K K n L g e g wg e g wV n wC eC1 2
1 1+ − + = +− −α α α( ) ( , ) ( , ) ' ( ) ( )        (5) 
)())(1( 11
1
2 gwggLnK C −=−−
−− δα αα                        (6) 
wC e w wg e g K n L g e gC( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )+ ≥ + −
− −
2
1 1α α α                 (7) 
             Equation (3) gives λ = 1. Equation (6) implicitly 
defines L L n e wC C= ( , , ,..) . Plugging this back to equation (6), we get n n e w= ( , ,..) . 
Rearranging equation (5), we get:      
                K n L g e g g w e gC2
1
1 11( )( ) ( , ) ( ' ( ) )− − = −
− −α φα α                                 (6)  
Plugging this in equation (7), we get:  
w C e g e g
w e g g e g
g
{ ( ) ( , )}











                                                     (7)′  
Substituting the expression from equation (7) in equation (5), we get the following 
equation:  
K n n L g e g wV n wC1
1( ,( ) ( , ) ) ' ( )− = −−α α                                                                (8) 
Equation (5) gives us the optimal number of children in the family. The left hand 
side represents the marginal benefit from increasing fertility whereas the right hand side 
                                                                                                                                                   
16 Our results are qualitatively unaltered if we instead assumed that all children can combine work and 
school. 
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represents the cost of increasing fertility. The change in utility in response to change in 
fertility is given by K K n L g e gC1 2
1 1+ − − −α α α( ) ( , ) . The wages earned by the marginal 
child as a skilled adult is given by wg e g( , ) . The total cost of bringing up and educating the 
marginal child, is captured by wC e wV n( ) ' ( )+ . In equilibrium, we must have that the 
marginal benefit from increasing fertility should be equal to the marginal cost. 
Equation (6) gives us the optimal level of education. The left hand side represents 
the marginal benefit from increase in quality and the right hand side reflects the cost of 
doing so. The change in wages earned by the children as skilled adults in response to a unit 
change in the level of education is given by w n L g e gC( ) ( , ).− 1 The satisfaction received by 
the parent due to the change in quality in response to a  change in education is given by 
K n L g e g gC2 11( )( ) ( , )− −
−α α α . The right hand side represents the rise in cost in response 
to a unit increase in the level of education captured by w n L eC( ) ' ( )− φ . In equilibrium the 
marginal benefit and the cost must balance each other. 
Equation (7) gives us the optimal level of child labor from the perspective of the 
family. The left hand side represents the opportunity cost of sending a child to school and 
the right hand side represents the gains from education and the increase in satisfaction from 
not sending a child to work. If it holds with strict inequality then all children are sent to 
work and marginal changes in policy have no effect on parents’ decision to send a child to 
work. Therefore we focus on the case where the equation holds with equality so that 
changes in policy have some effect on child labor and fertility decisions. The equilibrium 
level of education, fertility, child labor and consumption of M  are obtained recursively as 
follows. Given w , u , PM , g , t  the equilibrium level of education, e
∗  is obtained from (7). 
Equation (6) implicitly defines L L n e w u gC C= ( , , , , ) . Using this in equation (5), we 
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get n n e w u g= ( , , , ) . Plugging e∗  in (5), gives us the equilibrium level of fertility n∗ . 
Plugging e∗and n∗  in equation (6), gives us the optimal level of child labor LC
∗ . The 
equilibrium level of M  and A   is obtained from equation (3) and (4). 
 
Production: 
Now we turn to production. We assume that goods A  and M  are produced using 
CRS technology.  Production of A  requires adult unskilled labor, child labor and 
capital T , while production of M  requires adult unskilled labor, skilled labor and capital 
K . Note that child labor is used only in the production of A .  Since the economy is small, 
output prices are determined exogenously. Given the output prices and the tariff rate, the 
wage rate is determined by supply and demand in the labor market. We assume that 
producers maximize their profits. We derive the labor demand function from the profit 
maximizing conditions. Producers of A  maximize the following: 
π A A A TA l T wl r T= − −( , )                                                                        (8)" 
where lA  is the total amount of unskilled labor used in the production process. This yields 
the labor demand function lA  = l w TA A( , , )τ                                                (9) 
Similarly producers of  M  maximize profits which is given by 
π M M M M KP t M l K wl r K= + − −( ) ( , )                                                       (10) 
Profit maximization yields lM = l w P t KM M M( , , , )+ τ                                         (11)                         
whereτ A , τ M  represents technology associated with the production of A  
and M respectively. 
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The total demand for labor is therefore l w P t KM M M( , , , )+ τ + l w TA A( , , )τ . Now, 
we turn to supply of labor. Let LS  denote the labor supply, which is given by 
L wS ( ) =
{ ( )( ( ,..) ( ,..) ( ( ))} ( ,..) ( , )( ( ) ( ,..))1− − − + + −C e n w L w V n w L w g e g n w L wC C C ; 
where the first term within brackets represents the amount of adult unskilled labor supplied 
by the household. The second and the third term reflect the amount child labor and skilled 
labor supplied respectively. Note from the first order conditions of utility maximization, 
fertility and child labor is functions of the wage rate. Therefore the wage rate is determined 
by equating the demand and supply of labor as given below 
l w P t KM M M( , , , )+ τ + l w TA A( , , )τ = L w
S ( )                                                          (12) 
This implicitly defines   w w P t T KM A M= ( , , , , , ,..)τ τ                                          (13) 
 
Definition:  We say that the economy is in a high fertility equilibrium if K1  is negative 
and in a low fertility equilibrium if it is positive.  We state results 1 and 2 without proof.17 
 
Result 1:   
a) If K12 is positive (or negative) and large then  dn dw  < 0 (or >0).  
b) If  K12  is either positive or negative and sufficiently small, then dn dw  < 0 in a 
low fertility equilibrium.  
c) If  K12  is either negative or positive and sufficiently small, then dn dw  > 0 in a 
high fertility equilibrium. 
                                                 
17 The proofs are trivial and therefore omitted. 
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Comment: 
Suppose that K12  is sufficiently large and positive. A rise in wages increases child 
labor at the margin thereby reducing total quality. The reduction in quality must reduce the 
marginal utility of children, as a result fertility decreases. Now suppose that K12  is 
sufficiently small. Then fertility increases (decreases) depending on whether 1− V n' ( )  is 
positive (negative). Notice that 1− V n' ( ) = − K1 . Then whether  1− V n' ( )  is positive 
or negative depends on whether K1  is negative or positive. If it is positive then we have 
equilibrium with low fertility and if it is negative then we have high fertility equilibrium. 
This means that effect of wages on fertility depends on the nature of the equilibrium. If the 
equilibrium is characterized by low fertility then a rise in the wage rate reduces fertility 
whereas the opposite result holds otherwise. The intuition behind this result is simple, if 
rearing cost of additional children is less than what these children earn as child labor, then 
fertility is increased. The intuitions for the other cases are similar. 
 
Result 2:  
Child labor unambiguously increases in response to an increase in wages in the 
high fertility equilibrium if K12  is negative or positive and sufficiently small. 
 
Comment:  
From our first order conditions, we note that wages do not affect the optimal choice 
of education. A rise in the wage increases fertility (in a high fertility equilibrium). The 
increase in fertility must increase total quality, as a result marginal disutility of quality 
increases. Therefore child labor is increased. Mukhopadhyay (1994) analyzes the impact of 
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green revolution on fertility as well as child schooling. He finds that the rise in income due 
to the adoption of new technology was being invested in larger families. Also rise in 
income in the late 19th century saw a rapid fall in fertility in England. Thus our model is 
consistent with the finding that wages increase fertility in some cases and decreases it in 
others.  
 
Proposition 1: The labor supply function is positively sloped if either 
a) K21  is negative or positive and sufficiently small and the economy is in a high 
fertility equilibrium, or     
 b) K21  is positive or negative and sufficiently small and the economy is in a low 
fertility equilibrium. 
Proof:  




















C C= − − + −( ( , ) ( ))( ) ' ( )  




' ( )  < 
dn
dw













C C− − + −  






                                                 
18 The proof of this assertion is trivial and therefore relegated to the appendix to facilitate exposition. 
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From the first order conditions ( ( , ) ( ) )g e g C e− − ≤1 0   





C− − − ≥1 0 















 > 0. 





C−  < 0 if K21  is 
either positive or negative and sufficiently small. 










C C− − + −  












C C 1  








C1 1  





C− − −1  > 0  
 Also − −
dn
dw




 is positive. 
 
Comment: 
We first consider the high fertility equilibrium. If  K21  is negative or positive and 
sufficiently small, then a rise in wages reduces school enrollment. Since the level of 
education does not change, a reduction in school enrolment must necessarily reduce the 
cost of education in terms of adult labor time.  Child labor rises as well. On the other hand, 
adult labor supply goes down due to higher fertility, because rearing costs go up. However, 
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this increase in the supply of labor more than compensates the fall. Therefore, labor supply 
goes up. 
Now, consider low fertility equilibrium, since K21  is either positive or negative and 
sufficiently small, school enrollment falls. This frees up adult labor time, since the cost of 
education goes down. Lower fertility, also frees up time because of lower rearing costs. 
The resulting increase in the supply of labor, more than compensates a fall in child labor, if 
any, leading to an increase in the supply of labor.  
 
Proposition 2: The labor supply function is negatively sloped if  





C− − −1  > |( ' ( )) |1− V n
dn
dw
 and either 
 b) K21  is positive and large in a high fertility equilibrium, or     
 c) K21  is negative and large in a low fertility equilibrium. 
 
Proof:   
The proof is similar to the one outlined in proposition 1. 
 
Comment: 
Suppose that the economy is in a high fertility equilibrium. If  K21  is positive and 





C−  is positive. To see this, note that a rise in the wage rate increases 
child labor at the margin, as a result total quality falls. Therefore, the marginal utility of 
quality rises. Further, a rise in fertility also increases the marginal utility of quality. As a 
result, school enrollment increases. Similar results obtain for the case of low fertility. Now, 
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since school enrollment increases, adult labor supply must fall. Increase in fertility, also 
reduces supply of adult labor.  However, child labor supply increases. If condition a) is 
satisfied, then the fall in adult labor supply, outweighs the rise in child labor, thereby 
reducing the total supply of labor. The intuition behind the other case is similar. 
 
Proposition 3:  If   either condition a) or b) in proposition 1 holds then increasing tariffs or 
the capital stock ( K ) increases wages. 
 
Proof:  
 Consider an increase in tariffs. From equation (12) and (13) we know that the 
wage rate is implicitly defined as a function of tariffs. Using the implicit function theorem 



























 is positive.   The proof of the second part is similar. 
 
Comment:   
An increase in the tariff induces the firms to hire more labor, so the labor demand 
curve shifts out. If the supply curve is positively sloped, then this must increase wages. 
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Similarly, a rise in the capital stock increases the demand for labor. If the supply of labor is 
positively sloped, then the wage rate rises. 
 
Proposition 4:  If condition a) and either b) or c) of proposition 2 hold then increasing 
tariffs or the capital stock ( K ) reduces the wage rate provided that the slope of the supply 
curve is flatter than the slope of the total labor demand curve. 
Proof:  

















 > 0. 
Comment: 
A rise in the tariff rate increases the demand for labor. If the supply curve is 
negatively sloped, then the increase in the demand reduces the wage rate, provided the 
absolute slope of the supply curve is greater than that of the total demand curve.19 If this 
condition is not met then wages rise even if the supply curve is negatively sloped. 
 
Proposition 5:  If condition a) or b) of proposition 1 holds then in response to an increase 
in tariffs, 
a) Child labor and fertility increase in a high fertility equilibrium  
b) Fertility is decreased for sure in the low fertility equilibrium; the effect on 
child labor is ambiguous. 
Proof:   
Combining proposition 3 and result 1 and 2 completes the proof. 
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Comment:  
Proposition 1 state conditions under which the labor supply function is positively 
sloped. With a positively sloped labor supply curve, an increase in the tariff rate increases 
the demand for labor, thereby pushing wages up. In high fertility equilibrium, higher 
wages imply higher fertility and higher child labor. However, in a low fertility equilibrium, 
higher wages reduce fertility. The effect on child labor is ambiguous. On one hand, the 
increase in wages increases the opportunity cost of schooling. On the other hand, a fall in 
fertility reduces total quality; therefore, parents would want to send more children to 
school by taking them out of work.  Child labor rises or falls, depending on the relative 
strength of these two effects.  
 
3.3 A large open economy 
In this section we use the model described in section 3.2, except that we relax the 
price taker assumption, that is, now the country is assumed to have some market power. 
We analyze the impact of tariff on the terms of trade, given that fertility is endogenous and 
the household can send its children to work. We use the duality approach, to find the terms 
of trade effects as well as the optimal tariff. Since the country in question exports A , we 
use A  as superscript to denote the tariff imposing country while the rest of the world 
carries the superscript M . The expenditure function and the revenue functions are  
E P t U R P t L t E RA M
A A
M
S A A( , , ) ( , , ) ( )+ = + + −1 1 1 1                                           (14)                                          
E P U R PM M
M M
M( , , ) ( , )1 1=                                                                                 (15) 






M1 1 1 11 1 1 1( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , )+ + = + +                  (16) 
                                                                                                                                                   
19 We use the term strongly negative henceforth to mean that the slope of the supply curve in absolute terms 
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Equation (14) gives us the expenditure revenue function identity for the good A  
exporting nation. Equation (15) gives us the same for the rest of the world. Equation (16) 
gives us the supply of good M  in the world market. By Walras’ law, we only need the 
goods market equilibrium condition for a single market. 
Equation (14) implicitly definesU U P t LA A M
S= ( , , )                                          (14)´ 
Similarly equation (15) implicitly defines; 
U U PM M M= ( )                                                     (15)´ 
Plugging them back in equation (16) yields equation (16)′ below: 










M1 1 1 11 1 1 1( , , ( , , )) ( , , ( )) ( , , ) ( , )+ + = + +  (16)´ 
From the previous section recall that L L w P tS S M= ( ( , ,..)) . To avoid cluttering in notation 
we write the labor supply as L  and PM  as P . 
Therefore, equation (16)´ implicitly defines  P P t= ( )                                         (17) 
To find the effect of change in tariffs we use the implicit function theorem, which yields 
− =
+ + − −
+ − + + − + −
dP
dt
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The denominator is the slope of the excess demand function, and hence we require it to be 
negative for stability. The numerator can be rearranged as, 














w11 1 11 1 1+ − + −
∂
∂
.  Now,  E U
A
1  = 0, therefore, the numerator 
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w11 11 1− −
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 is clearly 
                                                                                                                                                   
is greater than the slope of the combined labor demand curve. 






 is positive. In that case, the sign of  
dP
dt
 turns out to be negative. 





 is negative, then the sign of 
dP
dt
 may turn out to be positive, if 







.   
Further, we check the conditions, under which the optimal tariff is negative, given 
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 < 0. We also know 
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 < 0, the optimal tariff is negative if   
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.   
Proposition 6:  An increase in tariffs  
a)  improves the terms of trade if the labor supply curve is positively sloped  
b) deteriorates the terms of trade if the labor supply curve is negatively sloped20 and if  








Proof:  Obvious. 
 
Comment:  
A rise in the tariff increases the domestic price of the import, thereby reducing 
demand. On the other the domestic supply increases, because a rise in wages increases the 
supply of labor. Thus the fall in the demand, coupled with the increase in supply, reduces 
the price of the import and improves the terms of trade. Now consider a negatively sloped 
labor supply curve. A rise in the tariff would reduce the demand of the import 
domestically. However, a rise in the tariff increases wages, but reduces the supply of labor 
provided; the labor supply curve is not strongly negative. A fall in the supply of labor 
contracts the domestic supply of the import. If this contraction in supply is sharp then the 
price of the import rises thereby deteriorating the terms of trade. 
Note that increase in the domestic supply of the import good, may influence the 
optimal tariff, in the presence of child labor and endogenous fertility. In other words, the 
endogenous change in the supply of labor may quantitative change the optimal tariff.  
                                                 
20  In the Heckscher-Ohlin model the possibility of an import subsidy arises even when the labor supply curve 
is positively sloped. 
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We take up this issue next. Note that from equation (14)′ we can 
expressU U P t t L w P t tA A= ( ( ), , ( ( ( ), ))) , that is, the utility of the importing country is 
implicitly a function of the tariff. 
We assume that the utility function is strictly concave, so that the optimal tariff 
exists and that the labor supply curve is positively sloped (so that the optimal tariff turns 
out to be positive).  
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A  and U L
A   and then solving we get 
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 is unambiguously positive if the labor supply 




















  evaluated at this optimal tariff is 
positive. Further we assume that 
R tR














 is negative since the numerator is 


























































      
The first term is zero if t = 0 . The second and the third term are negative. 






















positive then we can always find a $t ∈ ℜ , such that the above expression is zero.  Let ~t , t0   
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be the optimal tariffs in the presence and absence of child labor and endogenous fertility 
respectively. 
Now consider ~ $t t= , since the above expression equals zero at this value, therefore 
we must have ~t t= 0 .  In fact, we can go one step further and show that 
~ $t t=  iff ~t t= 0 . 
This implies that if the elasticity of foreign imports equals a certain value 
(namely $t ), then the optimal tariff in the absence of child labor and endogenous fertility is 
the same as the optimal tariff in the presence of them. However, if t t0 < $  then it turns out 
that the optimal tariff, ~t , is greater than t0 . On the other hand, if t t0 > $  then, just the 
opposite result obtains. We state the above results in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 7:  If t t0 < $ ( t t0 > $ ) then we must have t t t0 < <
~ $ ( ~ $t t t< <0 ). 
Proof:  See above. 
 
Comment: 
Consider an increase in the tariff (from a zero tariff situation). The increase in 
tariffs reduces the domestic demand for the import, and the increases the domestic supply. 
As a result, the world price of the import falls. If the elasticity of the import equals a 
certain value, $t , then the reduction in price increases the foreign demand sufficiently to 
absorb the increased supply of the import, in the domestic market. In that case, the optimal 
tariff in the presence of child labor and endogenous fertility remains unchanged. If the 
foreign elasticity is less than a certain value, then there is a further fall in the price of 
import because of the increased domestic supply. In that case, the optimal tariff can be 
increased to raise welfare. On the other hand, if the import elasticity is greater than $t , then 
                                                                                                                                                   
21 Our results go through even if we do not make this assumption. 
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the increased demand of the import in the foreign market more than compensates, the 




We analyze the role of tariffs in both a large country and a small country 
framework. We find that in the context of a small country, the effect of tariffs on child 
labor and fertility depends on the slope of the labor supply function as well as the type of 
equilibrium. Strictly speaking, we underline conditions where the labor supply curve is 
positively and negatively sloped. A rise in tariffs increases the wage rate, if the labor 
supply curve is positively sloped. Further, fertility and child labor increases in a high 
fertility equilibrium. However, in a low fertility equilibrium, fertility goes down for sure, 
the effect of rise in tariffs on child labor is ambiguous. In the context of a large country, we 
are able to show that, the effects of tariffs on terms of trade depend crucially on the slope 
of the labor supply curve. We analyze conditions under which tariff increases may 
deteriorate the terms of trade of the tariff imposing country. In that case, an import subsidy 
is clearly optimal. The issue of optimal tariff in this context is discussed. We are able to 
show that the optimal tariff in the presence of child labor may be lower or higher than the 
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                                                  Chapter 4 
         Are Preferential Trading Agreements building blocs to trade? 
 
                                                           Abstract 
We investigate whether preferential trading agreements are building blocs or stumbling 
blocs to multilateral trade. We use MFN and applied tariff data for 146 countries (including the 
European Union,) from 1988-2002, and conclude that free trade areas (bilateral and multination) 
are stumbling blocs to trade. In other words, we find that countries that are a part of some trade 
union have offer smaller tariff cuts than the ones who don’t. Customs unions, on the other hand are 
not found to be neither a building bloc nor a stumbling bloc to multilateral trade liberalization. 
This may be due to the fact that there is very little variation in the number of Customs unions 
formed during the time period considered. We also find that countries that sign more PTAs give 
have higher tariffs than countries that don’t. WTO members are also found to offer smaller tariff 
cuts than non WTO members. 
 
JEL Classification: D78; F13; F14; F15 
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4.1. Introduction 
There has been a huge proliferation in the number of preferential trading 
agreements (PTAs), in the world over the last decade. According to the WTO, there will be 
about 300 PTAs in force by 2005. Given that most WTO members, and all the large 
countries are members of some Preferential Trading Agreement, the effect of PTAs on 
world trade, is at the center of debate among trade theorists and policymakers. The 
dynamic time path question is, whether PTAs, in isolation or in tandem with multilateral 
trade liberalization (MTL), expand in a fashion which eventually subsumes all countries as 
its members without trade barriers (MTL path) or whether they undermine MTL by 
fragmenting the world into a few but powerful trading unions with higher trade barriers 
between each other?   
If membership into PTA entails lower tariffs for all countries regardless of 
membership status, then PTAs are building blocs to multilateral trade because it supplants 
the multilateral trade liberalization path through the GATT or WTO. If membership in a 
PTA, however, implies higher tariffs to non-members, then it is necessarily a stumbling 
bloc. There is some anecdotal evidence that countries often do not want to reduce 
multilateral tariffs because they erode the preferences given to other nations. One example 
Limao (2003) provides is that of low–value bottled and bulk rum which enters the United 
States, from several Caribbean countries under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Following is 
an excerpt from the Statement of Hon. Donna M.Christian-Christensen, Delegate, United 
States Virgin Islands, testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means, May 8th, 2001. 
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“In WTO tariff negotiations in 1996, U.S and E.U. negotiators had initially 
agreed to phase out all tariffs on rum and other “white spirits” by 2000. This unexpected 
development was met with alarm by Caribbean Governments, Administration Officials 
and Members of Congress. They emphasized to the trade negotiators that such a drastic 
change in the tariff structure for rum would deal a severe blow to the economies of the 
U.S. VI, Puerto Rico and the Caribbean. In response to this outcry, U.S. and E.U. 
negotiators, as well as Caribbean Government and producers, revisited rum tariffs (…). 
These discussions, which involved governments and officials at the highest levels of the 
various governments, resulted in a carefully constructed compromise for rum. Under this 
compromise the United States agreed to substantially liberalize duties on expensive rum. 
However, to protect the interest of the USVI and other Caribbean Island producers, the 
United States also agreed to maintain existing MFN rates on low value bottled and bulk 
rum.”22 
Given the second best nature of the problem, there is no a-priori reason to believe 
that PTAs are necessarily stumbling or building blocs.  Theorists remain divided on the 
wisdom of whether PTAs promote or slowdown MTL. Some authors have shown that 
PTAs may be stumbling blocs to multilateral trade liberalization. Levy (1997) shows the 
possibility to enter a PTA may cause a median voter to subsequently reject multilateral free 
trade even though he would have accepted it if no PTA had been available. Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) show that when producers are organized into lobbies, the PTAs that are 
most likely to occur are the ones that cause the largest trade diversion. Krishna (1998) 
shows similar results using a different setup. He also argues that these PTAs can reduce the 
incentive to MTL. The reason behind the result is that the rents generated by the 
                                                 
22 The paragraph is taken from Limao (2003). 
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formations of these PTAs, disappear when countries liberalize trade multilaterally. 
Producers that benefit from PTAs, therefore, will oppose MTL. In a pure trade model with 
sequential bargaining, Bagwell and Staiger (2003) show that WTO members may hold 
back tariff concessions on goods exported by countries expected to accede to the WTO. 
Limao (2002) models the interaction between PTAs between a large and a small country 
(Large Small PTA or LSPTA) and MTL.  He shows that LSPTAs generate a strategic 
motive for large countries to maintain some of their multilateral tariffs relatively higher. 
Richardson (1994) in a simple two good model with endogenous policy formulation shows 
that countries may prefer FTAs over CU because of lobbying efforts of interested 
industries. In an FTA domestic industries need only lobby the domestic government for 
external tariffs and results in lesser degree of free riding than in a CU. The greater degree 
of free riding in a CU lowers the common external tariff which implies that the external 
tariff levied in an FTA are higher than under a CU. Panagariya and Findlay (1996) in a 
three good Meade model show that the introduction of preferential trading can indeed raise 
protection against imports from the rest of the world. They also show that if the countries 
are symmetric23 then the common external tariff is lower under a CU than in an FTA. 
Some authors have shown that PTAs can actually be building blocs to multilateral 
trade. Bagwell and Staiger (1998) used a repeated game to analyze how PTAs affect the 
incentive to set a self-enforcing tariff. They show that two countries, A and B, gain from a 
PTA because they are relatively more patient, i.e., able to sustain lower tariffs for a longer 
period of time than the third one, C, which is impatient in that it is unable to do the same. 
If no PTA is allowed, then the same multilateral tariff is extended to C. If, however, PTAs 
                                                 
23 Two countries are symmetric in the sense that they choose the same external tariff under a FTA. However, 
if the countries are asymmetric then the common external tariff is lower and welfare higher than the country, 
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are allowed, then A and B can cooperate without reducing the tariff on C. This 
discriminatory effect leads to a higher multilateral tariff. There is also an offsetting tariff 
complementarity effect. When A and B lower tariffs for each other, they import more from 
each other and less from C, which reduces the cost of lowering tariffs on C. There are now 
two opposing effects at work, the tariff complementarity effect and the tariff 
discriminatory effect.  If A and B are very patient, then the discriminatory effect 
dominates, thereby leading to higher multilateral tariffs. Thus, they show that PTAs are 
stumbling blocs if A and B are very patient, and building blocs otherwise.  
   There are two ways to test for the building or stumbling bloc effect of PTAs. First 
one could test for the likelihood that PTA members participate in trade negotiations to 
liberalize trade multilaterally. Alternatively, one could also test whether membership in a 
PTA increases or lowers multilateral tariff barriers in comparison to multilateral trade 
liberalization undertaken without any recourse to PTAs. It is easier to test the effect of 
PTAs on multilateral trade barriers to infer whether they are stumbling or building blocs. 
To that end Limao (2003) uses detailed data on U.S. tariff concessions, during the most 
recent multilateral trade round to conclude that its PTAs were a significant stumbling bloc 
to multilateral trade liberalization. He shows that, the U.S. offers smaller tariff reductions 
to non-members on goods that are also imported from its PTA partners compared to goods, 
which are imported only from non-partners. This is the strategic stumbling bloc effect. He, 
however, focuses only on U.S. and its PTA partners.  
  Our empirical analysis is more general in the sense that it includes all PTAs 
(except preferential arrangements granted on an individual good basis).  We believe that 
we are the first to conduct such a comprehensive analysis. We distinguish between 
                                                                                                                                                   
which has the higher external tariff under an FTA. 
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different forms of PTAs, rather than treating them as homogenous unit, we break up PTAs 
into bilateral FTAs, multination FTAs (where more than two countries participate) and 
customs unions. In the empirical analysis that follows, we use MFN and applied tariff data 
for 14624 countries (including the European Union) from 1988-2002 and take account of all 
customs unions and free trade areas that were notified to the WTO until 2003 by these 
countries.          
After the 1990s, there was a significant increase in the number of PTAs. Most 
countries either formed new or joined existing PTAs. However, at the same time many 
countries also liberalized trade multilaterally. For instance India’s trade liberalization 
process started in 1991. We use a trend to capture the secular fall in tariff due to 
multilateral trade liberalization, pursued by these countries. The trend captures what 
multilateral tariffs would have been if there were no PTAs. The stumbling or building bloc 
effect of PTAs is measured relative to the trend. If PTAs lead to higher tariff levels than 
the trend, then they are stumbling blocs and building blocs if the opposite effect is 
observed. After controlling for MTL, we find that countries who are not members of any 
FTA have lower tariffs than countries who are members of some FTA.  We, therefore, 
conclude that bilateral and multination free trade areas25 are stumbling blocs to MTL. Our 
results lend support to the theoretical results that claim PTAs as stumbling blocs. Customs 
unions are found to have no stumbling or building bloc effect to multilateral trade 
liberalization. This may be due to the limited variation of new membership or the lack of 
formation of new customs union from 1988. However our results lend support to the 
                                                 
24 A list of countries and the preferential agreements entered by them is provided in Table 8. 
25 We focus our attention to Customs unions and Free Trade Areas. Preferences by countries granted under 
Article V of GATT are ignored except that we take GSP into account. Since we work with average tariffs 
over all goods and partner countries we do not include preferences granted on an individual good basis. 
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theoretical result that CUs have lower multilateral tariffs than PTAs. Our results also 
indicate that the WTO has been more effective than the GATT in the multilateral tariff 
liberalization process. We find that average tariffs have fallen considerably after 1995 (i.e., 
after the formation of WTO). 
We find that GATT/WTO members impose higher tariffs than non-WTO members 
with respect to the trend. The above result is observed because the incentives to reduce 
tariffs, by large margins, multilaterally are severely reduced for GATT/WTO members 
since the reduction must be extended to all. Moreover, reducing tariffs multilaterally 
creates a disincentive for preference receivers to participate in non-reciprocal trade 
concessions program such as the GSP, ATPA etc. We also test the dynamic time path 
question, from perspective of number of PTAs joined by a country. We test whether a 
country that joins more PTAs imposes higher or lower barriers to trade than countries that 
don’t.  We find that countries that sign more PTAs have higher average multilateral tariffs 
than those who do not. The results are qualitatively similar for different tariff measures 
used.26 
  The paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 outlines the methodology and 
description of the data. Results and related discussion are noted in Section 4.3. 
Conclusions follow in Section 4.4. The tables and figures are contained in the Appendix. 
 
4.2. Methodology and Data 
The objective of the paper is to test whether PTAs are building or stumbling blocs 
to multilateral trade liberalization. The dynamic time path question can be reformulated as 
                                                 
26 We use three different measures of tariffs, MFN tariff (simple average), MFN tariff (weighted average), 
applied tariff (simple average). 
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follows: Suppose that PTAs and MTL are adopted at the same time.  Two possibilities 
could arise. They could either be independent of one another or interact in some way. As 
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) note, it is reasonable to assume that if simultaneously 
embraced they will interact with one another. Then, will the process of PTA formation 
have a malign or benign impact on MTL? Specifically, we would like to know whether the 
scope of joining (or membership in) a PTA alters the tariff imposed on non-partners and if 
so, in which direction. Evidence suggests that, during 1988-2002, many countries have 
liberalized trade multilaterally. The liberalization process has been particularly pronounced 
after 1995.27  Keeping this multilateral trade liberalization process during 1988-2002 as the 
backdrop, we would like to know the role PTAs have played in this liberalization process. 
Did PTAs promote or slow down MTL? One way to test this question empirically would 
be to look at the tariffs imposed by PTA countries to non-PTA members compared to 
countries that do not belong to any PTA.   
In the model we test, we isolate the effect of PTAs (CU, bilateral FTA and 
multilateral FTA) for a number of reasons. Some authors believe that Customs unions have 
lower barriers to trade than free trade areas (Richardson 1994, Panagariya and Findlay 
1996). Further, CUs and FTAs are very different in scope and, therefore, cannot be lumped 
together as one.  On a similar note, we would also like to know whether bilateral PTAs are 
bigger or smaller stumbling blocs (or building blocs) to MTL than multilateral FTAs.  If a 
country joins more than one CU or FTA, then we take the earliest PTA into consideration. 
We identify the building bloc or stumbling bloc effect in the data by the sign of the 
                                                 
27 The list of countries that pursued MTL on and after 1995 is available from WTO.  
   See  www.wto.org . 
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coefficient of the dummies.28  A positive and significant coefficient means a higher 
average tariff level with respect to the MTL and as a result, a stumbling bloc.  They are 
building blocs to trade if the opposite sign is obtained. 
The role of membership in GATT/WTO also deserves mention. GATT/WTO 
members have a disincentive for multilateral tariff liberalization for a number of reasons. 
First, any tariff reductions must be extended to all the members. Second, reducing 
multilateral tariff also takes away the ability to grant preferences.  
Since member countries can get tariff concessions by free riding on others, there is 
a strong incentive to join the WTO. However in order to accede to the WTO a country 
must submit a report on its trade practices for examination by member countries. Therefore 
a country must reduce its tariff barriers. Existing members, on the other hand, have an 
incentive to hold back tariff concessions to a country that is expected to join the WTO, 
because the country in question will lower tariffs to become a WTO member, so no tariff 
concessions are needed to gain market access.29 However countries that are acceding to the 
WTO can behave strategically by reducing tariffs on goods that they import less by larger 
margins than those they import heavily. Tariff reductions, undertaken in such a way would 
reduce average tariff levels, required to accede to the WTO but will also restore higher 
tariff levels for targeted sectors.    
We empirically test for the stumbling bloc effect by estimating the following 
model: 
    Tit = b i +  a1 Cit + a2 Bit +a3 Fit +a4 WGit +a5 t+ eit               (1) 
                                                 
28 The building bloc or stumbling bloc effect is obtained in comparison to countries that do not have any PTA 
agreements. 
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where  Tit  is the average tariff of country i  in period t. We allow each country to have a 
different intercept, which is captured by bi. We create three dummy variables: Cit, Bit and 
Fit, which indicate whether country i is a member of a CU, bilateral free trade areas, 
multination free trade areas, respectively, at time t.30 We also create another dummy 
variable for GATT/WTO membership (WGit). As mentioned earlier, we capture the 
multilateral trade liberalization process that went on during the period by introducing a 
trend t.31 Here, eit is the error term.  Our null hypothesis is that the coefficients of CU, 
Bilateral FTA, multilateral FTA and GATT/WTO dummy individually equal zero.  
Furthermore, in order to determine whether more PTAs create higher barriers to 
trade, we test the following model: 
    Tit =b i +  a1 numCit + a2 numBit +a3 numFit +a4 WGit +a5 t+ eit                      (2) 
where numCit, numBit and numFit represent the number of CUs, Bilateral FTAs 
and/or Multilateral FTAs joined by a country at time t. 
 
Data 
We use TRAINS data available from the UNCTAD.   We collect data on simple 
average (MFN and applied) and weighted average tariffs (MFN) for all available reporter 
countries (146) from 1988-2002. They are obtained by averaging MFN (applied tariffs) 
                                                                                                                                                   
29 Bagwell and Staiger (2003) show that WTO members hold back tariff concessions to the exports of goods 
from countries expected to accede to the WTO. 
30 The European Union is treated as country. As a result we create two data sets; one includes bilateral Free 
Trade Agreements with EU as bilateral free trade dummies and the other as Multilateral Free Trade dummies. 
This reflects the fact that a country that enters into a free trade agreement with the EU actually trades freely 
with all EU members 
 
31 This information is available from www.wto.org. We also control for multilateral trade liberalization by 
using only year dummies. We find that tariffs actually increased in 1989 relative to 1988. However, except 
1989 tariffs levels were roughly stable for the period 1988-1996. Average tariffs fell substantially from 1997 
onwards. This shows that countries indeed pursued trade liberalization during 1995-2002. 
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over individual tariff lines and partner countries. All countries, however, do not have data 
for all years.  We get an unbalanced panel with 604 observations. Weighted average MFN 
is calculated by using import values as weights. As mentioned before, simple average and 
weighted average tariffs (MFN) and applied tariffs (simple average) have declined during 
1988-2002. The decline has been particularly pronounced after 1995 (see Figure 1-2).32   
To draw any conclusions on whether PTAs are building or stumbling blocs we need 
to look at the MFN tariff because preferences granted on a bilateral basis or among a few 
countries through a PTA, perhaps should not be treated as multilateral trade liberalization, 
if the tariffs imposed outside the PTA also increases. For instance, some countries may 
reduce tariff barriers among each other through a PTA but maintain higher tariffs for the 
rest of the world.33 As a result we look at what happens to multilateral tariffs levels when a 
country, in question, joins a PTA.  
We, however, also look at average applied tariffs.34 Applied tariffs are obtained by 
choosing the minimum of MFN tariff and preferential rates. We present our results for both 
MFN (simple average and weighted average) tariff and applied tariff (simple average35) in 
the next section.   
 
4.3. Results 
We test the first specification of our model (equation 1) with simple average MFN 
(Table 2) and weighted average MFN (Table 4). We carried out a Hausman Test and 
rejected the random effects model in every case. 
                                                 
32  Some descriptive statistics are included in Table 1. 
33  Bhagwati (1993). 
34 If a country offers a preferential rate for some goods to another country, then the applied tariff will take 
that into account. As a result simple average applied tariff will be lower than simple MFN tariff. 
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We find that the coefficient of Customs union has a negative sign but is not 
significantly different from zero for any measure of tariff we use (Tables 2 & 4). As noted 
earlier, this may be due to the limited variation in the number of Customs unions formed 
during the time period we consider. The coefficients of bilateral and multilateral Free trade 
areas, however, are positive and significantly different from zero36 for all measures used.  
The positive and significant coefficient of the bilateral and multilateral dummy 
implies that countries that have joined an FTA have higher average tariffs with respect to 
the trend.37 As mentioned before the trend captures what multilateral tariffs would have 
been if no PTAs existed. Since countries that did not join any FTA must have lower tariffs 
because of MTL, it is therefore clear that FTAs are stumbling blocs to MTL. Our results 
support the strand of theoretical literature that show that PTAs are stumbling blocs.                   
We find that the coefficient of GATT/WTO membership is positive and significant 
when we use a trend to capture the multilateral trade liberalization process. However, the 
coefficient becomes insignificant, when we use year dummies for simple average MFN 
tariffs.  We again get positive and significant coefficients, when weighted MFN tariffs are 
used, regardless of whether we use the trend or year dummies to capture MTL (Table 4). 
This suggests that countries, while deciding to become members of the GATT/WTO, take 
into account trade volumes in order to determine tariffs reductions. Tariff reductions are 
lower on goods that they import heavily from other WTO members compared to the ones 
                                                                                                                                                   
35 We use only the simple average applied tariff to ignore trade diversion effects. Trade diversion effects are 
likely to larger when weighted applied tariff are used. 
36 The coefficients of bilateral and multilateral FTA dummies are not significantly different from each other. 
Richardson (1994) and Panagariya and Findlay (1996) shows that tariffs are higher when countries form a 
FTA rather than a CU. Our results confirm this finding. 
37 The coefficients of all the dummies are not significantly different from zero when we don’t include a trend 
in our regression. This suggests that the formation of PTAs alone cannot explain the downward fall in tariffs. 
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that are imported less heavily, with respect to the trend. Thus there is some strategic 
interplay between members of the GATT/WTO when they liberalize trade multilaterally. 
The use of year dummies (d89 – d02) allows each year to have a different intercept 
and is therefore able to account for variations on a yearly basis.  We choose 1988 as the 
base year. We find that simple average tariff actually increased from 1988 to 1989.  Simple 
average MFN and weighted average tariffs for the years 1990-1996 were not significantly 
different from average tariff levels in 1988. The decline in tariffs began in 1997. This 
strongly suggests that countries have liberalized trade multilaterally after 1995.  
We create a dummy for GSP preferences granted. We find that the sign of the 
coefficient of the GSP dummy is positive but is not significantly different from zero for 
any measure of tariff used (Table 2 & 4). This may be due to the fact that the dummy 
assigns a value of one to countries that grant GSP over all goods in a given year, however, 
GSP is granted on an individual good basis and are applied to only a range of products.  
This might explain why our estimate for the coefficient of GSP dummy is not significant 
when simple average and weighted average MFN tariffs are used.   
The magnitude of the coefficient also deserves some mention. For the average 
MFN tariff, we find that countries that join some bilateral PTAs have 21% higher tariffs 
than the average. Similarly multination PTA members, impose tariffs that are 24% higher 
than the average. GATT/WTO members also have tariffs that are about 23% higher than 
the average. Results for the weighted average MFN are similar.  
We also test what happens to average MFN tariffs (Table 3) and weighted average 
MFN (Table 5) when a country joins more PTAs following equation 2. The coefficients for 
the number of bilateral and multilateral free trade areas are positive and significantly 
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different from zero when we use average MFN tariffs. This suggests that countries that 
have joined more FTAs have higher average tariffs, with respect to the trend.  For 
weighted average MFN tariffs we find that only the coefficient of the number of 
multilateral tariff is significant. This implies that countries that join more multilateral 
FTAs are bigger stumbling blocs to trade than the ones who join more bilateral FTAs. We 
do not find significant coefficients for the number of CUs joined. This may be because 
there are no countries that have joined more than one CU. We include both the 
GATT/WTO and GSP dummy in this specification. The coefficient of GSP is not 
significant for any measure of tariffs used as before.  The coefficient of the GATT/WTO 
specification is not significantly different from zero. 
The magnitude of the coefficient, as before, is also of importance here.  For the 
simple average MFN tariff, we find that joining one more bilateral PTA increases the tariff 
by 2% with respect to the average. Joining another multination PTA increases the tariff by 
19% with respect to the tariff. We also find similar results for the weighted average MFN 
tariffs. 
Now we turn to test our first and second specification of our model with simple 
average applied tariffs.  The average applied tariff follows the same pattern as average 
MFN and weighted average MFN tariffs. The average applied tariff increased in 1989. The 
average tariff levels remained the roughly the same till 1996. Tariffs started falling 
significantly after 1996.  
The results are reported in Table 6 and Table 7 respectively. We find that for the 
first specification (Table 6) the co-efficient of the CU dummy has a negative sign but is not 
significantly different from zero. The coefficients of Bilateral and multilateral FTA 
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dummies are positive significant. The GATT/WTO dummy is also positive and significant. 
The interpretations of the coefficient of the dummies remain the same as before. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients, using average applied tariffs, are similar to the other cases  
(Average MFN and weighted average MFN tariffs) and carry the same interpretation. 
When we introduce a set of year dummies for into this specification, we find that 
the results are not affected except that the coefficient of GATT/WTO dummy is no longer 
significant as mentioned before. This may be because of the fact that GATT/WTO 
members give larger tariff reductions on good that they import less relative to the ones they 
import more heavily from other WTO members.  
We also include preferences granted under GSP in our regression together with the 
trend. The results are qualitatively similar to the other cases we have examined.   The 
coefficient of the GSP dummy has the expected sign but is not significant for the same 
reason as noted above. 
For the second specification (equation 2) we find that countries that join more 
bilateral PTAs have higher tariffs relative to the trend. A notable difference is that the 
coefficient of multilateral free trade areas becomes insignificant when average applied 
tariffs are used which may occur because upon joining a multilateral free trade areas, a 
country reduces its tariffs on more countries than under a bilateral FTA, thereby reducing 
simple applied average by a larger margin than in a bilateral FTA.  
The magnitude of the coefficients for the second specification using the average 
applied tariff is somewhat different from the other cases. For the average applied tariff, we 
find that joining another bilateral trading union increases the average applied tariff by 2%; 
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however, joining another multination PTA does not seem to increase the tariff. This may 
be due to the reason noted above. 
As with the first specification, we also include GSP dummies. We find that the 
coefficient of GSP is positive in sign but not significant. Overall, we find that the 
stumbling bloc effect of FTAs is robust to different tariff measures used.  For the first 
specification the coefficient of both bilateral and multilateral dummies are positive and 
significant. For the second specification the coefficient of the number of bilateral FTAs is 
positive and significant, however the sign of the coefficient of the number of multilateral 
FTAs is not significantly different from zero for reasons noted above. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
Our analysis shows that countries that are members of bilateral or multilateral free 
trade areas have higher average MFN (both simple and weighted) and applied tariffs than 
countries that are not. This results support the theoretical finding that PTAs are stumbling 
blocs [Bhagwati (1993), Levy (1997), Bagwell and Staiger (1998) and Krishna (1998)]. 
We also find that GATT/WTO members offer smaller tariff cuts on goods that they import 
heavily from other WTO members compared to the ones they import less with respect to 
the trend because the incentives to reduce tariffs, by large margins, multilaterally are 
severely reduced for GATT/WTO members since the reduction must be extended to all. 
Moreover, reducing tariffs multilaterally creates a disincentive for preference receivers to 
participate in non-reciprocal trade concessions program such as the GSP, ATPA, etc.  We 
also find that WTO has been a more effective in reducing tariffs multilaterally than the 
GATT. We test our model with three alternate measures of tariffs. Our results are robust to 
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all measures. Finally, we find that a country that joins more PTAs have higher multilateral 
tariffs than countries that don’t. Our results are robust except that the coefficient of number 
of multilateral Free trade areas is not significant when we use average applied tariffs 
because as a country signs more PTAs (multilaterally), it reduces its tariffs over more 
countries (multilateral FTA members) compared to a bilateral FTA, thereby reducing the 
applied average by more than under a bilateral FTA. As a result, we do not find countries 
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wavgtmhs:  Weighted average MFN tariffs; avgt: Applied average tariffs       
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
avgt overall 13.58191 9.930901 0 100.3265 N =     598
between 8.538261 0 49.9749 n =     146
within 5.220495 -17.4583 63.9335 T-bar = 4.09589
avgtmhs overall 14.00378 9.683278 0 100.406 N =     604
between 8.325272 0 50.0022 n =     148
within 5.214538 -17.058 64.40758 T-bar = 4.08108
wavgt overall 11.21543 8.599598 0 87.05174 N =     599
between 7.364318 0 45.39585 n =     146
within 4.508873 -13.442 52.87133 T-bar = 4.10274
wavgtmhs overall 11.59158 8.401111 0 87.05174 N =     605
between 7.18505 0 45.3999 n =     148
within 4.575619 -13.0629 53.24342 T-bar = 4.08784
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  Table 2
        Results from regressing average MFN tariff (avgtmhs) on Preferential
       Trading Agreements using fixed effects
          Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
         ***significant at the 1% level;** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level
Variables Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates
Constant    1585.9***





   14.60***
 (2.45)
Trend     -0.79***
 (0.08)
     -0.78***
   (0.08)








   (3.13)
     -1.70
 (3.13)




   2.95**
 (1.31)
     2.99**
  (1.31)







   3.40**
 (1.56)
    3.50**
  (1.56)






   3.36**
 (1.72)









(3.16) …. …. ….
WTO ….     -1.41




       No       No No Yes
R2 0.190 0.191    0.188 0.210 
No. of Obs. 604
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                                                                       Table 3 
                    
    Results from regressing average MFN tariff (avgtmhs) on number of PTAs using 
    fixed effects.                                
 
 
             Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 











  (229.45) 
 1526.83*** 
  (151.85) 





     -0.76*** 
  (0.07) 
    -0.63*** 
 (0.12) 



















  0.29* 
 (0.17) 
   0.29** 
 (0.14) 
   0.29** 
 (0.14) 






   2.71** 
 (1.18) 
  2.92** 
(1.19) 
   2.72** 
 (1.18) 





       3.03* 
      (1.71) 
 2.89* 
(1.71) 







       0.25 
      (3.68) 
…. …. …. 
 



















No. of Obs. 
 
604 
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Table 4 
 
       Results from regressing weighted average MFN tariff (wavgtmhs) on PTA 
       dummies with fixed effects. 
     
  
                Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
   ***significant at the 1% level;** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
                                                               
 











  1488.92*** 
   (135.82) 
1261.91*** 
  (201.48) 
1458.08*** 
  (134.92) 





   -0.74*** 
(0.06) 
   -0.63*** 
(0.10) 


















    2.33** 
 (1.12) 
   2.31** 
(1.13) 
   2.38** 
(1.13) 





    2.94** 
 (1.35) 
   3.27** 
(1.36) 
   3.06** 
(1.35) 





     3.79*** 
 (1.48) 
   3.60** 
(1.49) 
    3.71*** 
(1.49) 





  4.68* 
 (2.72) 











     No 
 













No. of Obs. 
 
605 
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Table 5 
 
         Results from regressing weighted average MFN tariff (wavgtmhs) on number of 
        PTAs using fixed effects. 
 
      
 Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 













  (129.31) 
1241.36*** 
  (197.92) 
  1449.67*** 






   -0.72*** 
(0.06) 
   -0.62*** 
(0.10) 














    1.24 






   0.25** 
 (0.12) 
   0.26** 
 (0.12) 
  0.22* 





  2.65** 
     (1.02) 
    2.88*** 
(1.03) 
    2.72*** 
(1.02) 
   2.38** 




      3.55** 
     (1.48) 
   3.40** 
 (1.48) 
   3.51** 
(1.48) 
   2.95** 
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                                   Table 6 
       
       Results from regressing applied average tariff (avgt) on PTA dummies using    




                Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
               ***significant at the 1% level;** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 















  -0.75*** 
   (0.08) 
   -0.61*** 
(0.12) 






















  2.62** 
(1.32) 
2.18* 
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                                                      Table 7 
 
  Results from regressing average applied tariff ( avgt) on number of PTAs 
          using fixed effects. 
 
                Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 






                                                               





  (153.86) 
1214.57*** 
  (231.99) 
1461.00*** 
  (153.29) 





























   0.33** 
    (0.16) 
   0.32** 
 (0.14) 
   0.33** 
 (0.14) 
   0.29** 
 (0.14) 
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Table 8:  List of Countries with PTAs by Date of entry into Force  (pages 100 – 104)  
Name Bilateral Free Trade 
Multilateral Free 
Trade Customs Union Preferences
Albania
Algeria EC(76) GSTP(90)





Australia CER(83) PATCRA(77) SPARTECA(81)
Austria EFTA(60) EC(95)
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Name Bilateral Free Trade 
Multilateral Free 
Trade Customs Union Preferences
China BA(01)
Colombia MERCOSUR(92) CAN(88), LAIA(81)
Congo, Rep. CEMAC(99)
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Name Bilateral Free Trade Multilateral Free Trade Customs Union Preferences
Indonesia AFTA(92),GSTP(89)






US(85) EC(00), EFTA(93) PTN(73)
Jamaica CARICOM(73)
Japan Singapore(02)
Jordan US(01) EC(02), EFTA(02)
Kenya COMESA(81), EAC(00)








Moldova(96) CIS(94) EAEC(97) ECO(92)
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Name Bilateral Free Trade Multilateral Free Trade Customs Union Preferences
Moldova Romania(95), Kyrgyz(96) CIS(94)
Montserrat CARICOM(74)














Papua New Guinea PATCRA(73) MSG(93),SPARTECA(81)










































St. Kitts and Nevis CARICOM(74)















Sw eden EFTA(60) EC(95)
Sw itzerland Faeroe(96) EC(73),EFTA(60)




Thailand Laos (91) AFTA(92), GSTP(89)
Togo WAEMU(00)
Trinidad and Tobago CARICOM(73) GSTP(89)
Tunisia EC(98) GSTP(89),PTN(73)














CUFTA(89), Jordan(01), Israel 
(85) NAFTA(95)
Uruguay MERCOSUR(88) LAIA(81), PTN(73)










Zimbabw e COMESA(94), GSTP(89)
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                                            Chapter 5 
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5.1. Conclusion: 
In this chapter we briefly summarize and conclude the contributions of this 
dissertation to the literature. We break up the conclusion in three different subsections. 
Each subsection will be devoted for each chapter of the dissertation.  
 
5.2.1 Endogenous Fertility, Educational Attainment and Child Labor: Do 
Subsidies work? 
It is hard to overstate the importance of looking into the problem of child labor. 
Given that about 40% of all children are engaged in some form of child labor without 
having the option of going to school is indeed painful. However the main concern lies in 
the fact that due to lack of adequate human capital formation the capacity for growth in 
countries where child labor is rampant are severely hampered. That explains in part why 
governments in these countries have given such importance to the eradication of child 
labor. The prime instrument has been to provide these children with education so that they 
may earn a better living in the future. 
Various programs have been designed to achieve this target. Compulsory 
education, government sponsored vocational education programs, building new schools, 
giving financial support in cash or in kind to households those harbor child labor. We 
analyze the role of education subsidies and its effect on child labor in a one good model 
where parents decide how many children to have and the level of education for them. 
Parents are assumed to care about not only the quantity of children but also on total 
quality. We find that the response to education subsidies depends on whether households 
attach more weight to the number of children going to school or the educational level of 
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each child.  We show that lump sum education subsidies may increase (or decrease) the 
equilibrium level of education and child labor depending on whether parents attach more 
weight to quality (or the number of children in school ) ignoring fertility effects.  Marginal 
education subsidies, in general, have the exact opposite effect. Since marginal and lump 
sum education subsidies affect child labor in opposite directions, education subsidies 
including elements of both may fail to decrease the incidence of child labor 
In fact, educational subsidies given under PROGRESA are observed to have very 
little effect on the incidence of child labor. We are also able to throw light on the empirical 
finding that educational subsidies have no discernible effect on parents’ decision to send a 
child to work.  If fertility effects are included then our results follow provided fertility 
effects are small magnitude.  
Cartwright (1999) analyzes 1993 survey data for rural and urban children in 
Columbia and finds that the more expensive schooling is, the less likely it is that the child 
will work. She suggests that here the cost of education serves as a proxy for school quality. 
However in most developing countries schools, which cater to the poor in both rural and 
urban regions, are more likely to be of low quality. Most schools are inadequately staffed 
and lack facilities such as running tap water, sanitation etc. Thus quality considerations 
cannot explain why child labor decreases in response to a rise in the cost of schooling.  
Cartwright and Patrinos (1999) find that cost of schooling increases the probability 
that a child will work in Bolivia. Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) analyze the work and 
school choices in Ghana, and find that cost of schooling increases both the probability of 
work and the probability of school attendance. We are able to explain why one may 
observe seemingly contradictory effects of education on child labor across countries. 
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5.2.2 Endogenous Fertility, Child Labor and Optimal Tariffs 
The recent proliferation of preferential trading agreements has been of growing 
concern among trade theorist. The initial skepticism was centered on whether preferential 
trading agreements were a movement towards or away from free trade. If it was a 
movement away from free trade then who gains and who loses?  This has created a discord 
among trade theorist. Some opine that preferential trading agreements are welfare 
improving while others argue that they are not. In so far as trade movements determine 
factor incomes, the role of trade liberalization through a multilateral system like the WTO 
or through preferential trading agreements is important. Given that many countries that 
host child labor also have joined preferential trading agreements or have liberalized trade, 
the consequence of such liberalization process on child labor needs to be examined. We 
develop a model to address these questions. We find that trade liberalization through any 
means have a direct impact both on fertility and the incidence of child labor.   
Since tariff reduction is the main instrument for freeing trade, we analyze the role 
of tariffs in both a large country and a small country framework. We find that in the 
context of a small country, the effect of tariffs on child labor and fertility depends on the 
slope of the labor supply function as well as the type of equilibrium. Strictly speaking, we 
underline conditions where the labor supply curve is positively and negatively sloped. A 
rise in tariffs increases the wage rate, if the labor supply curve is positively sloped. Further 
fertility and child labor increases in high fertility equilibrium. However, in a low fertility 
equilibrium fertility goes down for sure, the effect of rise in tariffs on child labor is 
ambiguous. In the context of a large country we are able to show that the effects of tariffs 
depend crucially on the slope of the labor supply curve. We further analyze conditions 
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under which tariff increases may deteriorate the terms of trade of the tariff imposing 
country. In that case an import subsidy is clearly optimal. The issue of optimal tariff in this 
context is discussed. We are able to show that the optimal tariff in the presence of child 
labor may be lower or higher than the optimal tariff without these conditions.  
 
5.2.3 Are Preferential Trading Agreements Stumbling Blocs to Trade? 
According to the WTO there will be about 300 hundred preferential trading 
agreements (PTAs) in force by 2005. Given that most WTO members and all the largest 
countries are a part of some preferential trading agreement the effect of PTAs on the world 
trading system is hard to overemphasize.  The dynamic time path question is whether 
PTAs, in isolation or in tandem with multilateral trade liberalization (MTL), expand in a 
fashion which eventually subsumes all countries as its members without trade barriers 
(MTL path) or whether they undermine MTL by fragmenting the world into a few but 
powerful trading unions with higher trade barriers between each other?   
If membership into PTA entails lower tariffs for all countries regardless of 
membership status, then PTAs are building blocs to multilateral trade because it supplants 
the multilateral trade liberalization path through the GATT or WTO. If membership in a 
PTA, however, implies higher tariffs to non-members, then it is necessarily a stumbling 
bloc. There is some anecdotal evidence that countries often do not want to reduce 
multilateral tariffs because they erode the preferences given to other nations. There is no a 
priori reason to believe that PTAs are building or stumbling. This is because the second 
best nature of the problem. Although the literature on PTA is enormous there is very little 
empirical evidence for or against PTAs. We examine the role of PTAs in terms of whether 
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they are building blocs or stumbling blocs to multilateral trade. We analyze data on 146 
countries for the period 1988-2002.       
Our analysis shows that countries that are members of bilateral or multilateral Free 
trade areas have higher average MFN (both simple and weighted) and applied tariffs than 
countries that are not. These results support the theoretical finding that PTAs are stumbling 
blocs [Bhagwati (1993), Levy (1997), Bagwell and Staiger (1998) and Krishna (1998)]. 
We also find that GATT/WTO members offer smaller tariff cuts on goods that they import 
heavily from other WTO members compared to the ones they import less with respect to 
the trend. This is because the incentives to reduce tariffs, by large margins, multilaterally 
are severely reduced for GATT/WTO members since the reduction must be extended to all. 
Moreover, reducing tariffs multilaterally creates a disincentive for preference receivers to 
participate in non-reciprocal trade concessions program such as the GSP, ATPA, etc.  We 
also find that WTO has been a more effective in reducing tariffs multilaterally than the 
GATT. We test our model with three alternate measures of tariffs. Our results are robust to 
all measures. Finally, we claim that a country that joins more FTAs have higher 
multilateral tariffs than countries that don’t.  We find that multilateral free trade areas are 
bigger stumbling blocs to trade when MFN tariffs are used.  However, the coefficient of 
number of multilateral free trade areas is not significant when we use average applied 
tariffs. This is because as a country signs more PTAs (multilaterally), it reduces its tariffs 
over more countries (multilateral FTA members) compared to a bilateral FTA, thereby 
reducing the applied average by more than under a bilateral FTA. As a result we do not 
find countries that join more multilateral trade areas to have higher applied average tariffs 
than countries that don’t. 
